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Social Checks and Balances: A Private 
Fairness Doctrine  
Michael P. Vandenbergh∗ 
This Essay proposes a private standards and certification system 
to induce media firms to provide more complete and accurate 
information. It argues that this new private governance system is a 
viable response to the channelized flow of information that is 
exacerbating political polarization in the United States. Specifically, 
this Essay proposes development of a new private fairness doctrine to 
replace the standard repealed by the Federal Communications 
Commission in 1987. A broad-based, multistakeholder organization 
could develop and implement this private fairness doctrine, and the 
certification process could harness market and social pressure to 
influence the practices of traditional and new media firms. A growing 
literature demonstrates how private governance initiatives can perform 
the functions of government in the environmental, labor, gun control, 
animal welfare, and fair trade areas. This Essay argues that private 
governance initiatives such as the new private fairness doctrine can also 
bolster the social checks and balances that support the processes of 
democratic governance. Any intervention into the flow of information 
creates risks, but so does inaction, and the private fairness doctrine 
holds out the possibility of improving the information available for 
public discourse while limiting the risks of government intervention. In 
the long term, the concept of private governance can also stimulate 
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creative thinking on interventions to improve other core democratic 
processes, including campaign finance, voting, ballot security, and 
others.  
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INTRODUCTION 
  If I am a liberal, I can get my news from liberal cable television 
programs, listen to liberal radio stations, read liberal newspapers and 
blogs, and receive filtered information tailored to my liberal views from 
Facebook, Google, and Twitter. I can easily avoid inconvenient 
conservative opinions or facts that might support a conservative policy. 
If I am a conservative, I can do the same, except that I will watch Fox 
News, not MSNBC; listen to Rush Limbaugh, not Progress radio; read 
the Wall Street Journal editorial page, not the Washington Post; and 
read Breitbart, not the Huffington Post. The filters used by new media 
firms will expose me to conservative sources of information and screen 
out liberal sources. I can live in a conservative world, unfettered by 
inconvenient liberal opinions or the facts that support them.  
  Some channelized flow of information has always been a feature 
of political discourse in the United States—the Founders famously used 
their own captive newspapers to put their preferred spin on the issues 
of the day—but a growing body of empirical research suggests that the 
channelization of information flows has become pervasive in the last 
several decades.1 Similarly, polarization has always been a feature of 
political discourse in the United States. The Founders used their 
captive newspapers and other means for vicious political and personal 
attacks on opponents, and certainly the polarization leading up to the 
Civil War was intense.2 But a growing literature again suggests that 
 
 1. For reviews of the literature, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN 
THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2017) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC]; and CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 (2007). For an early examination in the popular press of the extremism fostered 
by new media, see Elizabeth Kolbert, The Things People Say, NEW YORKER (Oct. 26, 2009), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/11/02/the-things-people-say [perma.cc/EKY6-V7HD]. 
 2. Compare JILL LEPORE, THESE TRUTHS: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (2018) 
(suggesting that polarization has been common in American history and that the post–World War 
II period of lower polarization was an anomaly), and RICHARD WHITE, THE REPUBLIC FOR WHICH 
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the current era is at the extreme end. Regardless of whether 
polarization levels are comparable to past levels, polarization is 
impairing the ability of government to respond to core problems today:3 
studies suggest that polarization correlates with, and perhaps is a 
substantial cause of, the inability of the federal and state governments 
to respond to core social problems.4  
The social checks and balances that placed some constraints on 
politicians’ partisan behavior in past eras also seem to be at a low ebb. 
In the 1950s, Robert Dahl argued that social influences limit the efforts 
of many politicians and political operatives to abuse common norms of 
fair play.5 For instance, state legislators may be discouraged from 
skewing legislative voting procedures while in office because of concerns 
that doing so will be exposed and will induce their opponents to do so 
when they are in office. According to Dahl, social checks and balances 
are a frequently overlooked element of a successful democracy. The 
point is not that politicians and political operatives never engaged in 
self-dealing or manipulated norms of fair play—and the use of raced-
based voting requirements in the South is a prime example—but in 
many areas of the country social checks and balances provided 
meaningful constraints on overreaching by these actors. Numerous 
commentators have noted that these core norms of democratic fair play 
have eroded substantially in the last two decades.6   
This Essay argues that the channelized flow of information has 
undermined the enforcement of the social norms that function as social 
 
IT STANDS: THE UNITED STATES DURING RECONSTRUCTION AND THE GILDED AGE: 1865-1896 (2017) 
(noting high levels of polarization during the second half of the nineteenth century), with ROBERT 
B. TALISSE, OVERDOING DEMOCRACY: WHY WE MUST PUT POLITICS IN ITS PLACE (2019) (suggesting 
that polarization has increased and has extended to areas such as consumer behavior, workplaces, 
and residential settlement patterns). 
 3. See Aaron M. McCright, Chenyang Xiao & Riley E. Dunlap, Political Polarization on 
Support for Government Spending on Environmental Protection in the USA, 1974–2012, 48 SOC. 
SCI. RES. 251 (2014) (examining polarization on environmental issues). 
 4. For a recent discussion, see MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, 
BEYOND POLITICS: THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 119–76 (2017). 
 5. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 83 (1956) (arguing that the 
presence of such social constraints “may be far more important in strengthening democracy than 
any particular constitutional design”); see also discussion infra notes 97–99 (exploring how implicit 
social and political norms may constrain the party in power).  
 6. See, e.g., STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 12, 84–90 (2018) 
(noting the declining role of core democratic norms such as mutual toleration (accepting rivals as 
legitimate) and forbearance (exercising restraint rather than using full constitutional powers)); 
Evan McMullin, An Attack on the Rule of Law, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 13, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/04/assault-on-democracy/557912/ 
[https://perma.cc/J498-BV9D] (criticizing President Trump’s attacks on American institutions as 
undermining democratic legitimacy); see also Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric 
Constitutional Hardball, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 915, 940–43 (2018) (noting the importance of 
differences in norms between Democrats and Republicans in pursuing constitutional strategies). 
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checks and balances. Dahl’s original use of the term social checks and 
balances referred to the informal norms that constrain the behavior of 
politicians and political operatives, enforced through the iterative 
relationships among politicians and the oversight of the general public. 
The channelized flow of information undermines enforcement of these 
norms; it can enable a politician’s constituents to avoid exposure to 
negative information about the behavior of the politician and create 
justifications for violation of fair-play norms. In this setting, the social 
checks and balances that might induce a politician to accept rivals as 
legitimate and exercise self-restraint when in power are weak at best.7  
This is not the place to resolve debates among historians, 
political scientists, and lawyers about the relationships among 
information channelization, polarization, and social checks and 
balances. Instead, this Essay assumes that the channelized flow of 
information through traditional and new media is exacerbating the 
polarization and dysfunction of the U.S. political process. Drawing on 
the emerging private governance literature,8 this Essay proposes a new 
private standards and certification system designed to induce 
traditional and new media companies to provide more complete and 
accurate information. In turn, that information may enable more 
informed democratic discourse, reduce polarization, and buttress social 
checks and balances. For convenience, I use the term private fairness 
doctrine to refer to both the new fairness doctrine standard and the 
organization that would implement the standard. 
 
 7. See LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 6.  
 8. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 
129, 146 (2013) (defining “private environmental governance” and explaining that “actions taken 
by . . . non-governmental [environmental] entities often include the traditional standard-setting, 
implementation, monitoring, enforcement, and adjudication functions of governments”). Similarly, 
in recent years scholars have noted that civil society can play “the pluralistic Congress’s popular, 
deliberative role.” Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. 
REV. 515, 552 (2015); see also Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory 
Rivals: An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 250 (2016) 
(noting the role of civil society in influencing agency actions). The private governance initiatives I 
focus on here induce not just the groups often included in “civil society,” but also other private-
sector actors, and they play roles that serve the functions performed not just by Congress, but by 
all three branches of government. New Governance scholars have emphasized the importance of 
public-private hybrids, but government coercive force, resources, and coordination remain 
important in New Governance scholarship. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A 
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 345 (1998) (describing 
“[e]xperimentalist agencies dedicated to comparative evaluation of public and private actors”). In 
contrast, private governance initiatives involve interactions between private parties that affect 
issues commonly assigned to government but occur with little or no government involvement. 
Private governance thus includes actions taken by nongovernmental entities that achieve 
traditionally governmental ends such as managing the exploitation of common pool resources, 
increasing the provision of public goods, setting labor or health standards, or reducing 
environmental externalities. See infra Part I (discussing the genesis of private governance 
initiatives).  
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The private fairness doctrine would evaluate traditional and 
new media firms not based on any particular media story or report, 
which would be difficult and expensive to do on a timely basis, but based 
on periodic evaluations of the systems the media organization has in 
place to provide complete and accurate information. With the repeal of 
the Fairness Doctrine by the Federal Communications Commission 
(“FCC”) in 1987, the federal government stopped policing the fairness 
and accuracy of information conveyed by radio and television stations.9 
The private fairness doctrine cannot solve the problem of channelized 
information flows, but it can harness market and social pressure to 
provide a partial substitute for the old public standard.  
An existing or new broad, multistakeholder organization could 
develop and implement the new private standard, following widely 
adopted protocols developed for private standards and certification 
systems.10 It could conduct transparent processes that produce, take 
comment on, and periodically update the standard. Independent 
auditors could perform the certification assessments. The content of the 
new standard could be drawn from the earlier FCC standard, with 
modifications to reflect developments in technology and lessons learned 
from the FCC experience. The standard should seek greater accuracy 
and completeness, but it should not seek balance. Although appealing 
on the surface, balance can easily be manipulated to create a false sense 
of equivalency on issues ranging from vaccination risks to climate 
change.11 The certifications issued by this organization could solve 
many of the information and coordination problems confronted by 
advertisers and advocacy groups, enabling them to create and steer 
market and social pressure toward media firms in a way that is now 
done on a more limited and haphazard basis.   
A brief example illustrates how the new private fairness doctrine 
could function. An executive at a major retailer today may be faced with 
competing demands from liberals and conservatives to stop advertising 
on The Rachel Maddow Show or Laura Ingraham’s “Ingraham Angle,” 
yet the executive may lack the information necessary to know which 
show is misstating or omitting key facts and may fear backlash from 
the other side once a decision is announced. As to television and radio 
stations, until 1987, the FCC’s Fairness Doctrine provided some 
 
 9. See discussion infra notes 100–137 and accompanying text (discussing the FCC fairness 
doctrine in greater depth).   
 10. See, e.g., What are Credible Sustainability Standards?, ISEAL ALLIANCE, 
https://www.isealalliance.org/credible-sustainability-standards/what-are-credible-sustainability-
standards (last visited Apr. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/BP7Z-PFTM]. 
 11. See discussion supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text (discussing polarization and its 
distortive effects on information flows). 
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constraints that the FCC enforced through the power of the federal 
licensing process.12 It may not be a coincidence that MSNBC and Fox 
News were founded in the decade after the demise of the Fairness 
Doctrine.13 Similar issues arise with advertising on Facebook, Google, 
Twitter, and other new media sources. The struggles of Facebook and 
Twitter, in particular, to develop systems that address concerns about 
bias and the accuracy of political and policy-relevant advertisements 
have been the subject of substantial amounts of media coverage and 
academic research.14    
A private standards and certification organization could 
evaluate the systems in place at each of the major traditional and new 
media organizations and score them. Retailers could announce in 
advance that they will only advertise on “A”-rated television and radio 
programs and new media services, and their market power could then 
motivate traditional and new media organizations to put the systems in 
place necessary to achieve an “A” rating. Advocacy groups could also 
draw on the certifications when conducting naming-and-shaming, 
boycott, and other public-focused campaigns. The private fairness 
doctrine could harness these private market and social forces, improve 
the governance of private initiatives that target the media, and 
ultimately improve the flow of information necessary for deliberative 
democracy.   
Why might the private fairness doctrine succeed? A growing 
body of literature demonstrates how private governance initiatives are 
performing the functions of government in the environmental, labor, 
gun control, animal welfare, fair trade, and other areas.15 They often do 
 
 12. See discussion infra notes 100–137 and accompanying text.  
 13. See Jill Lepore, The Hacking of America, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/14/sunday-review/politics-disruption-media-technology.html 
[https://perma.cc/3TQA-72RX] (noting MSNBC and Fox were founded in 1996). 
 14. See Marjorie Heins, The Brave New World of Social Media Censorship, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
FORUM 325, 326 (2014) (noting that Facebook’s censorship rules curtail speech otherwise protected 
by the First Amendment and “[u]nlike censorship decisions by government agencies, the process 
in the private world of social media is secret”); Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, 
Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1660 (2018) (“[P]latforms 
play no significant role—yet—in determining whether content is true or false or whether coverage 
is fair or unfair.”); Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. REG. 547 (2016) 
(discussing the use of consumer-driven complaints to police content); see also Kristen E. 
Eichensehr, Digital Switzerlands, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 665 (2019) (discussing the extent to which 
internet companies perform governmental functions). For a recent example of Facebook’s efforts 
to include outside experts to resolve and validate its decisions on advertising, see Tony Romm, 
Facebook Unveils Charter for Its ‘Supreme Court,’ Where Users Can Go to Contest the Company’s 
Decisions, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/09/17/ 
facebook-unveils-charter-its-supreme-court-where-users-can-go-contest-companys-decisions/ 
[https://perma.cc/LG9A-PQP4]. 
 15. Scholars in many fields have explored how private organizations can perform 
governmental functions, although they have used a variety of terms for the concept. See, e.g., 
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not achieve all of their goals16 and are often a second-best option when 
government action is not viable, but many have measurable effects on 
firm behavior.17 A remarkable number and type of private initiatives 
have emerged in recent years, and these private governance initiatives 
are now common in the United States and around the globe. Studies by 
political scientists, economists, and sociologists have examined why 
they arise and the extent to which they are performing governmental 
functions.18 For instance, more than ten percent of all fish caught for 
human consumption around the world is subject to the private 
standards set by the Marine Stewardship Council (“MSC”).19 More than 
eighty percent of the lending for project finance development around 
the world is subject to the Equator Principles, private environmental 
disclosure standards modeled on the National Environmental Policy 
 
TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, KOSHER: PRIVATE REGULATION IN THE AGE OF INDUSTRIAL FOOD (2013) 
(discussing the growth of private kosher certification agencies in the food industry); Kenneth W. 
Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the 
Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 44  (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods 
eds., 2009) (discussing the rise and function of alternative “governance arrangements,” including 
industry associations and NGOs); David P. Baron, Private Politics, Corporate Social 
Responsibility, and Integrated Strategy, 10 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 7, 7 (2001) (proposing “a 
theory of private politics in which an activist seeks to change the production practices of a firm for 
the purpose of redistribution to those whose interests it supports”); Tim Bartley, Certifying Forests 
and Factories: States, Social Movements, and the Rise of Private Regulation in the Apparel and 
Forest Products Fields, 31 POL. & SOC’Y 433, 434–37 (2003) (introducing emergent systems of 
private regulation in North American apparel and forest products sectors); Steven Bernstein & 
Benjamin Cashore, Can Non-State Global Governance be Legitimate? An Analytical Framework, 1 
REG. & GOVERNANCE 347, 349–50 (2007) (“Where national and international regulation of 
significant global social and environmental problems has been absent or weak, an array of 
voluntary, self-regulatory, shared governance, and private arangements has begun to fill the policy 
void.”); Errol E. Meidinger, Environmental Certification Programs and U.S. Environmental Law: 
Closer than You May Think, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10162, 10162 (2001) (listing several examples of 
influential nongovernmental “environmental certification programs”); David Vogel, The Private 
Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct, 49 BUS. & SOC’Y 68, 69–70 (2010) (“Global civil 
regulation—voluntary, private, nonstate industry and cross-industry codes that specify the 
responsibilities of global firms for addressing labor practices, environmental performances, and 
human rights have become a highly visible and increasingly legitimate dimension of global 
economic governance.”).  
 16. See Jennifer Jacquet et al., Seafood Stewardship in Crisis, 467 NATURE 28, 29 (2010) 
(discussing how “the incentives of the market have led [a seafood stewardship] certification scheme 
away from its original goal, towards promoting the certification of ever-larger capital-intensive 
operations”).  
 17. See STEERING COMM. OF THE STATE-OF-KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENT OF STANDARDS & 
CERTIFICATION, TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY: THE ROLES AND LIMITATIONS OF CERTIFICATION 9 (2012) 
[hereinafter TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY], https://www.rainforest-alliance.org/sites/default/files/ 
2016-08/toward-sustainability.pdf [https://perma.cc/BGT3-TE27] (discussing the “current market 
status of key voluntary standards and certification systems”). 
 18. See id. at 6–13 (discussing the emergence and function of private standards and 
certification systems).  
 19. Rob Fletcher, MSC Sets 20 Percent Global Coverage Goal, FISH SITE (Oct. 5, 2017, 12:43 
PM), https://thefishsite.com/articles/msc-sets-20-percent-global-coverage-goal [https://perma.cc/ 
DEA3-KP82]. 
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Act (“NEPA”) and managed by a private organization.20 Although much 
remains to be understood about these private governance initiatives, 
they are proliferating, and research suggests that they can influence 
the behavior of organizations and individuals even absent the coercive 
power and resources of government.21   
A private standards and certification system could go wrong in 
many ways. It could become captive of particular market, social or 
political interests.22 It could generate valuable assessments of media 
processes but not generate sufficient market or social pressure to affect 
media behavior. It could affect media behavior but not improve the 
quality of the information used in political discourse and 
decisionmaking. This Essay examines these concerns and concludes 
that although they present genuine threats, the most important 
question is how the private fairness doctrine would compare to the 
likely alternatives: revival of government regulation or continued 
muddling through without systematic, accountable oversight. The 
former is highly unlikely, and if it occurs it may be worse than the 
current situation. Ironically, a private standard, if carefully designed 
and implemented, may produce a more democratically accountable 
system than a government regulatory standard developed through 
 
 20. Equator Principles, FIRST FOR SUSTAINABILITY, https://firstforsustainability.org/ 
sustainability/external-initiatives/sustainability-frameworks/equator-principles/ (last visited Apr. 
1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/KZM4-LWXQ]. Private standards use many of the same instruments 
and address many of the same subject matter areas as the major federal environmental statutes. 
See Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, Parallels in Public and Private Environmental Governance, 5 
MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 10 (2015) (“By ‘parallel’ we mean that private actors are adopting 
similar techniques and methods as those that public regulators use to address environmental 
problems . . . .”); Sarah E. Light & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 
in II DECISION MAKING IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 253, 254 (LeRoy C. Paddock et al. eds., 2016) 
(arguing that “private governance is an important source of environmental standards and 
initiatives that both complement and compete with positive law”). 
 21. See generally TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 17 (explaining the proliferation of 
voluntary labeling initiatives and certification standards and evaluating their effectiveness). 
These private systems often draw on or increase existing financial and social motivations for 
individuals and organizations to act. See Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as 
Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137, 162 (2019) (noting that “[m]arkets affect behavior by 
making it more or less costly as a function of price, while norms affect behavior by making it more 
or less costly as a result of social sanction or approbation”). Shifts in other areas of law may be 
necessary to avoid consumer information overload and other barriers to private initiatives. See 
David E. Adelman, Trademarks and Private Environmental Governance, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
709, 713 (2018) (discussing how “the technical nature of this information increases the risk of 
information overload: the more ecolabels there are, the more information there is to process, and 
the more likely consumers will be to use shortcuts (that savvy marketing can exploit) or to give up 
entirely”).  
 22. See Miriam Seifter, Complementary Separations of Power, 9 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 186, 
187–89 (2016) (arguing that Congress is less vulnerable to “inequality and exclusion” than civil 
society).  
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current government processes or through government regulation or 
other pressure as threatened by President Trump.23  
Private efforts thus far have taken important steps but have 
been insufficient. Nonpartisan fact-checking organizations have 
emerged, as have efforts to shame or boycott media companies based on 
the perceived accuracy or fairness of the information they distribute. 
Many of these initiatives have been short-term, ad hoc, single-issue-
focused efforts, and they have had mixed success thus far. To be 
effective, the new private fairness doctrine would need to have 
widespread backing, legitimacy, and reach, but the beauty of a well-
designed private standards and certification system is that the 
stakeholders who manage the system may be more responsive to public 
preferences than politicians: the largest retail firms, institutional 
investors, and nonprofit organizations have many limitations, but they 
have incentives to reach large audiences and thus may be more 
accountable to a broad swath of the population than are politicians.24 
Many large retail firms must appeal to a diverse, national, or global 
customer base and cannot gerrymander their markets. Similarly, media 
firms need a social license to operate in addition to various legal 
licenses, and the certification provided by a private fairness doctrine 
organization could serve as a proxy.25 Defectors can voice their concerns 
 
 23. See, e.g., Alyza Sebenius & Ben Brody, Trump Says U.S. Should Sue Facebook, Google, 
BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-26/trump-says-u-s-
should-sue-facebook-google-in-latest-complaint [https://perma.cc/2FHQ-7DQN] (noting that 
President Trump has threatened a government suit against Facebook and Google); see also Chris 
Hughes, It’s Time to Break up Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
05/09/opinion/sunday/chris-hughes-facebook-zuckerberg.html [https://perma.cc/64KM-D78U] 
(suggesting government antitrust action against Facebook).  
 24. See discussion infra notes 55–61 (exploring the potential for private governance to guide 
corporate behavior). An evaluation of the situations in which markets or government better reflect 
public preferences is beyond the scope of this Essay. Cass Sunstein concludes that “market 
ordering is undemocratic and that choices made through the political process are a preferable basis 
for social ordering,” but argues that  
[a] generalization of this sort would be far too broad in light of the multiple breakdowns 
of the political process and the advantages of market ordering in many arenas. But it 
would also be a mistake to suggest, as some do, that markets always reflect individual 
choice more reliably than politics, or that political choices differ from consumption 
outcomes only because of confusion, as voters fail to realize that they must ultimately 
bear the costs of the programs they favor. 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 57–
69 (1990). 
 25. Neil Gunningham et al., Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses 
Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 307, 308–10 (2004) (concluding that corporations 
operate as though they need a social license to operate). 
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to the supporters of the private standard or exit to form a competing 
standard.26  
Part I of this Essay briefly discusses the emergence of private 
governance initiatives. It focuses on the common features of influential 
private standards and certification systems and provides a simple 
model explaining why they arise and why they can be effective. Part II 
then examines how information flow problems exacerbate the 
polarization that is undermining formal and informal democratic 
processes. Part III proposes an initiative to develop, administer, and 
enforce a private fairness doctrine and discusses objections and 
extensions. It also notes that while this Essay focuses on the flow of 
information, the concept of private governance can also stimulate 
creative thinking about other core democratic processes, including 
campaign finance, voting, and ballot security.27  
I. PRIVATE GOVERNANCE MODELS  
Private governance initiatives have proliferated in the last two 
decades. These initiatives have performed governmental functions on a 
wide range of important topics, including fisheries, forests, labor, fair 
trade, gun control, organic food, animal welfare, and others.28 This Part 
explores why private governance initiatives emerge and how they 
function, and it identifies critical elements for the design of the private 
fairness doctrine.   
Private governance organizations motivate behavior change 
based on market, social, and private legal pressure rather than relying 
on government taxes, subsidies, or regulations. Market and legal 
influences are front and center in much of the legal literature, but it is 
important not to underestimate the power of personal and social norms. 
In recent decades, research in social psychology and sociology has 
demonstrated that personal norms exert strong influence on behavior.29 
In other words, even if others cannot observe a behavior, if an individual 
believes the behavior to be morally wrong, engaging in it can cause 
feelings of guilt or anxiety that discourage the behavior. Individuals 
 
 26. Cf. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 4 (1970) (theorizing the “exit” and “voice” options whereby firm 
management discovers its failings).  
 27. See, e.g., Ganesh Sitaraman, Contracting Around Citizens United, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 
755, 758 (2014) (examining a private contract between Republican Scott Brown and Democrat 
Elizabeth Warren to limit out-of-state political action committee (“PAC”) campaign contributions).  
 28. See sources cited supra note 15 (examining how different private organizations perform 
governmental functions). 
 29. See Paul C. Stern, Information, Incentives, and Proenvironmental Consumer Behavior, 22 
J. CONSUMER POL’Y 461, 464, 466 (1999). 
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and organizations can activate the personal norms held by individuals, 
inducing them to engage in behaviors that are consistent with their 
norms.30  
In addition, scholars in political science, economics, sociology, 
psychology, and other fields have explored the range of social influences 
that affect the behavior of individuals and organizations. Even in the 
absence of personal norms, people often respond to two types of social 
norms:31 they tend to act as others think they should act (injunctive 
norms) and in ways that they think others are acting (descriptive 
norms).32 This occurs even if no moral, social, economic, or legal 
sanctions or rewards are likely to arise from the behavior. Research has 
demonstrated that social norms are at least as influential as personal 
norms and are easier to model.33 The importance of personal and social 
norms has induced leading social scientists to argue that corporations 
not only need a legal license to operate, but also a social license to 
operate.34   
Nobel Prize–winning research by Elinor Ostrom and colleagues 
demonstrated how groups organize to manage collective resources even 
absent government intervention.35 Ostrom’s work identified the 
conditions that are often necessary for this form of private ordering to 
succeed. Much of Ostrom’s work focused on small groups, but scholars 
 
 30. Id. at 462–63 (citing Shalom H. Schwartz, Universals in the Content and Structure of 
Values: Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries, 25 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 54, 65 (1992)). 
 31. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 11–35 (2000); Robert B. Cialdini, Carl A. 
Kallgren & Raymond R. Reno, A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: A Theoretical Refinement 
and Reevaluation of the Role of Norms in Human Behavior, 24 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 201, 202–04 (1991). 
 32. Cialdini et al., supra note 31, at 201–04. For a discussion in the legal literature, see 
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (noting 
that people largely govern themselves through social norms). 
 33. See ELLICKSON, supra note 32, at 124, 132; POSNER, supra note 31, at 34–35. For a 
discussion in the political science literature, see ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE 
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 35–37 (1990); ELINOR OSTROM, 
UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 259 (2005); and Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom & Paul 
C. Stern, The Struggle to Govern the Commons, 302 SCI. 1907, 1908 (2003) (noting that effective 
commons governance depends, in part, on “frequent face-to-face communication and dense social 
networks [at the local level]—sometimes called social capital—that increase the potential for trust, 
allow people to express and see emotional reactions to distrust, and lower the cost of monitoring 
behavior and inducing rule compliance”); see also Oran R. Young, Building Regimes for 
Socioecological Systems: Institutional Diagnostics, in INSTITUTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
CHANGE: PRINCIPAL FINDINGS, APPLICATIONS, AND RESEARCH FRONTIERS 115, 123 (Oran R. Young, 
Leslie A. King & Heike Schroeder eds., 2008) (discussing effective “self-contained” institutional 
arrangements). 
 34. See Gunningham et al., supra note 25, at 308–10 (discussing the importance of social 
licenses and how they can encourage companies to go beyond mere compliance in the context of 
safety measures). 
 35. For a review, see Dietz, Ostrom & Stern, supra note 33, at 1907. 
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have also demonstrated how large, complex private institutions have 
arisen to set and enforce standards in other settings.36 Private 
governance initiatives have led to the formation of private 
organizations that perform the types of standard-setting, 
implementation, monitoring, enforcement, and dispute resolution 
functions that are the bread and butter of government agencies.37 These 
private governance initiatives are not examples of the government 
privatizing its functions or of public-private hybrids.38 Instead, 
government plays little or no role in the formation and operation of 
these initiatives. The absence of government involvement distinguishes 
private governance from privatization and public-private hybrids, and 
the lack of dependence on government action is particularly important 
when standard democratic processes break down. By untethering the 
performance of governmental functions from government, private 
governance initiatives can bypass the dysfunctions of government that 
can arise from polarization, capture by special interests, and other 
factors.39 
Some private initiatives focus explicitly on rewarding or 
penalizing corporations and other organizations for their political 
conduct,40 but most private governance initiatives perform a function 
 
 36. See sources cited supra note 15 (examining how different private organizations perform 
governmental functions). 
 37. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 15, at 46–47 (discussing nonstate standards in 
implementation, monitoring, and enforcement); Bernstein & Cashore, supra note 15, at 349–50 
(identifying features of nonstate, market-driven governance systems).  
 38. The term private governance is not synonymous with privatization, which occurs when 
the government contracts out governmental functions, such as with private prisons. Compare 
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman & Martha 
Minow eds., 2009) (discussing government outsourcing to private organizations), with 
Vandenbergh, supra note 8, at 174 (exploring the “independent regulatory role often played by 
private actors, not just public agencies or public–private hybrids”). In some cases, private 
initiatives are developed in response to public laws, see Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life 
of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2030–32 (2005), but private governance does not occur 
because government outsourced its functions by contracting with private parties. Instead, it occurs 
when private initiatives fill gaps in, complement, or compete with government activities. 
 39. The Georgia legislature’s attempt to block Delta Airlines’ efforts to support gun control 
after the Parkland, Florida, shooting is an example of a government effort to prevent a company 
from responding to widespread public preference. The Georgia legislature used state tax pressure 
to push Delta Airlines to reinstate a benefit program for National Rifle Association (“NRA”) 
members. Richard Fausset, Georgia Passes Bill that Stings Delta over N.R.A. Position, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/01/business/delta-nra-georgia.html [https:// 
perma.cc/WMQ6-VM4K]. A second tactic is litigation to undercut private and quasi-governmental 
initiatives. For instance, the NRA sued the New York state pension fund to prevent it from 
disfavoring investments in gun manufacturers. Jacey Fortin, N.R.A. Suit Claims Cuomo’s 
‘Blacklisting’ Has Cost It Millions of Dollars, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/08/04/nyregion/nra-broke-financial-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/TC7P-2L67]. 
 40. For instance, an organization called Buy Partisan allows individuals to make purchasing 
decisions based on whether a firm’s executives support Republicans or Democrats. See BUY 
PARTISAN, http://buypartisan.com/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/GT23-SFEX] 
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traditionally assigned to governments rather than explicitly attempting 
to influence the political process. The environmental field has been one 
of the most robust areas for private governance activity,41 with 
initiatives on topics ranging from climate mitigation to toxics regulation 
to forest and fisheries management.42 Private governance initiatives 
have also developed on other topics. For instance, private initiatives are 
taking a leading role in gun control: several retailers have adopted 
restrictions on the sale of guns and ammunition, and other firms, 
including Levi Strauss & Co. and Delta Airlines, have supported gun 
restrictions.43 Similarly, a deep literature has examined how Nike and 
many other large retailers have set labor standards for clothing 
manufacturers and has pointed out the successes and failures of those 
efforts.44 On animal welfare, firms ranging from Chipotle to McDonald’s 
to Chick-fil-A have set standards of care for the chickens and eggs they 
buy from corporate suppliers.45   
 
(urging website visitors to “Scan. Discover. Decide. Shop according to your values”). The 
organization offers a cell phone application that allows individuals to scan products to learn about 
the donations by the firm or its executives. Similarly, an organization called 2nd Vote encourages 
conservatives to use their purchasing power to push corporations to adopt conservative values and 
policies. See 2ND VOTE, https://www.2ndvote.com/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/735E-XSQ8]; see also Joel Ebert, Diane Black’s Ties to Conservative Nonprofit 
Raise Concerns About How She Would Treat Companies, TENNESSEAN (July 23, 2018), 
https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/tn-elections/2018/07/23/tn-governors-race-diane-
black-ties-conservative-nonprofit-2nd-vote-raise-concerns-elections/800451002/ 
[https://perma.cc/8HWX-9HH8] (discussing 2nd Vote). 
 41. Vandenbergh, supra note 8, at 130–31; see also Upcoming Lautenberg Bill Could Be Key 
Test for TSCA Reform This Congress, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., Apr. 1, 2011, at 6 (quoting Ernie 
Rosenberg of the American Cleaning Institute for the proposition that “[t]he loss of public 
confidence [in the public regulatory system means] we’re going to increasingly have retailers that 
are regulators, like Wal-Mart and Target”). 
 42. The MSC sets sustainable fishery standards rather than trying to induce governments to 
set standards. Its private standards regulate more than ten percent of all fish caught for human 
consumption around the world. The Forest Stewardship Council sets and enforces private 
sustainable forestry practices for roughly fifteen percent of all temperate forests. Vandenbergh, 
supra note 8, at 148–50. 
 43. See Abha Bhattarai, Levi Strauss CEO Takes a Side on Gun Control: ‘It’s Inevitable that 
We’re Going to Alienate Some Consumers’, WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2018, 10:57 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/09/10/levi-strauss-ceo-takes-side-gun-control-its-
inevitable-that-were-going-alienate-some-consumers/ [https://perma.cc/EBA4-V5KN]; discussion 
supra note 39. For discussion of corporate responses to efforts by the NRA to block firearm 
regulations, see Jackie Wattles, Delta and United Join List of Companies to Cut Ties with the NRA, 
CNN (Feb. 24, 2018), http://money.cnn.com/2018/02/23/news/companies/enterprise-nra-car-rental-
discounts/index.html [https://perma.cc/Y64Z-7Y9W]; and see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, How Banks 
Could Control Gun Sales if Washington Won’t, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/19/business/banks-gun-sales.html [https://perma.cc/62MK-
W2K6] (discussing how banks could lower weapon sales by refusing to do business with certain 
gun shops).  
 44. For an early analysis, see Dara O’Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing 
Nongovernmental Systems of Labor Standards and Monitoring, 31 POL’Y STUD. J. 1, 7–10 (2003). 
 45. See Gina-Marie Cheeseman, Chipotle Rolls Out New Animal Welfare Standards for 
Chickens, TRIPLE PUNDIT (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.triplepundit.com/2017/01/chipotle-new-
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Taken as a whole, the literature across multiple disciplines and 
topics demonstrates how private organizations have used private 
coercion and resources to serve traditionally governmental functions. 
The point is not that these private initiatives have been uniformly 
successful or beneficial. A number of these initiatives have achieved 
demonstrable successes in changing the behavior of key actors or in 
changing the targeted conditions, but some have had only limited 
success, and others have failed outright (e.g., an effort to set a private 
standard to limit the harvesting of tropical fish for household 
aquariums).46 Rigorous empirical and theoretical research is needed to 
assess how these private initiatives arise, whether they accomplish 
their goals, how they should be evaluated as compared to government 
actions, the spillover effects on government actions, and other issues. 
The on-the-ground examples, empirical studies, and theoretical work to 
date, though, demonstrate that private initiatives can play a proof-of-
concept role and can perform or complement governmental functions on 
a wide range of topics.  
The Equator Principles provide a potential model for the private 
fairness doctrine. The Equator Principles are private standards that are 
roughly analogous to NEPA, the federal statute that requires disclosure 
of the human and environmental impacts of major federal decisions. 
NEPA has become a model for many states and foreign governments, 
but a large gap exists in the reach of NEPA and its public law 
analogues. Roughly half of the states and most countries do not have a 
NEPA-equivalent statute, and the federal NEPA requirements do not 
apply to activities in the United States that do not involve a major 
federal action.  
In the 1990s, advocacy groups conducted naming-and-shaming 
campaigns regarding the environmental harms arising from projects in 
the developing world that were financed by major public and private 
lenders.47 These advocacy group campaigns induced the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund to develop guidelines regarding 
 
animal-welfare-standard-chickens/ [https://perma.cc/5G2B-2ZUP]; Chick-fil-A to Source 100 
Percent Cage-Free Eggs, CHICKEN WIRE (Mar. 9, 2016), https://thechickenwire.chick-fil-
a.com/News/Chick-fil-A-to-Source-100-Percent-Cage-Free-Eggs [https://perma.cc/AM8M-6XWS]; 
McDonald’s Elevates Chicken Welfare Standards, QSR (Oct. 30, 2017), 
https://www.qsrmagazine.com/news/mcdonalds-elevates-chicken-welfare-standards 
[https://perma.cc/C6C5-7AA9]. 
 46. For a review of these systems, see TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 17.  
 47. See Nigel Clayton, The Equator Principles and Social Rights: Incomplete Protection in a 
Self-Regulatory World, 11 ENVTL. L. REV. 173, 185–87 (2009) (describing several examples of 
nongovernmental organizations calling out banks for transparency, consultation, and 
environmental issues related to projects in the developing world). 
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environmental impacts and to reduce funding levels.48 These efforts 
also induced private banks to form the Equator Principles, private 
standards that require the project developers to disclose and reduce the 
environmental harms of the projects funded through project finance 
loans.49 Lenders representing more than eighty percent of global project 
finance lending are now signatories to the Equator Principles. As with 
the international, national, and subnational government disclosure 
standards, the effects of the Equator Principles on the environmental 
harms from covered projects are difficult to assess, but the private 
requirements have substantially increased the disclosure of 
environmental information for projects that otherwise would not be 
subject to federal-, state-, or foreign-law disclosure requirements.50  
The Equator Principles standards share many common features 
with the MSC standards for sustainable fisheries and other major 
private sustainability standards. This is not by chance: stakeholders 
and the funders who support these organizations have pushed for 
processes that will enhance legitimacy. The result is a private 
organization called ISEAL Alliance, which sets standards for private 
standard-setting organizations.51 Common organizational components 
 
 48. See, e.g., Environmental and Social Standards (ESS), WORLD BANK, 
https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/environmental-and-social-framework/brief/ 
environmental-and-social-standards (last visited Apr. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/GK89-QMX6]; 
IMF and the Sustainable Development Goals, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Feb. 26, 2020), 
https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/46/Sustainable-Development-
Goals [https://perma.cc/J9WQ-VMDX]. 
 49. See The Equator Principles: June 2006, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES (2006), https://equator-
principles.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/equator_principles_II.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQ3X-
VCRX] (describing the Equator Principles framework, “[a] financial industry benchmark for 
determining, assessing, and managing social and environmental risk in project financing”); see 
also Carbon Counts 2007: The Carbon Footprints of UK Investment Funds, TRUCOST (July 18, 
2007), http://www.trucost.com/published-research/19/carbon-counts-2007-the-carbon-footprints-
of-uk-investment-funds [https://perma.cc/WCY9-BAS3] (ranking UK equity funds by their carbon 
footprints). 
 50. See Ariel Meyerstein, Transnational Private Financial Regulation and Sustainable 
Development: An Empirical Assessment of the Implementation of the Equator Principles, 45 N.Y.U. 
J. INT’L L. & POL. 487 (2013) (exploring how the impact of governance regimes can be measured); 
Andrew Hardenbrook, Note, The Equator Principles: The Private Financial Sector’s Attempt at 
Environmental Responsibility, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 197 (2007) (analyzing whether the 
Equator Principles are having a positive impact and achieving their goals in developing countries); 
Marissa Marco, Note, Accountability in International Project Finance: The Equator Principles and 
the Creation of Third-Party-Beneficiary Status for Project-Affected Communities, 34 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 452 (2011). 
 51. See ISEAL ALLIANCE, https://www.isealalliance.org/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/QU48-UA7R]. ISEAL has set several standards for standard-setting 
organizations. ISEAL Credibility Principles, ISEAL ALLIANCE, https://www.isealalliance.org/ 
credible-sustainability-standards/iseal-credibility-principles (last visited Apr. 1, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/RAQ7-5STF]; Setting Social and Environmental Standards: ISEAL Code of Good 
Practice, ISEAL ALLIANCE (2014), https://www.isealalliance.org/ sites/default/files/resource/2017-
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include a broad-based stakeholder group that plays a guiding or 
advising role, a secretariat that administers the standards, and 
mechanisms for enforcement and dispute resolution. The process for 
producing and updating the standards often closely resembles the core 
aspects of Administrative Procedure Act notice and comment 
rulemaking: the organization publishes a draft standard, solicits 
comments, responds to comments, modifies the standard, and 
republishes it in final form. The Equator Principles are now in their 
third iteration of this process. The MSC standards are updated in this 
way on a periodic basis,52 as are the FSC standards.53  
Private government organizations deploy many of the same 
instruments as are used in government regulation and address many of 
the same topic areas.54 Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms vary 
but typically require some form of third-party auditing and use denial 
of certification as the principal enforcement tool. Certification conveys 
the imprimatur of the organization and enables a regulated firm to 
easily communicate its status to the firm’s stakeholders, whether 
corporate or retail customers, advocacy groups, investors, lenders, 
employee groups, or government regulators.  
How can these types of private initiatives drive behavior change 
among individuals, corporations, and other targets without the coercive 
power or resources of government? The drivers of participation in 
private governance initiatives are not fully understood and likely vary 
across participants and initiatives, but research in several fields has 
provided an initial snapshot. Private governance initiatives often arise 
after advocacy groups have conducted naming-and-shaming campaigns 
to induce companies to participate in the formation of the standards.55 
Companies respond to these campaigns for a complex mix of reasons 
that likely include concerns that the advocacy groups will be able to 
stimulate shifts in market behavior (e.g., actions by consumers, 
employees, managers, investors, and lenders) or nonmarket social 
behavior (e.g., pressure from individuals and religious, university, civic, 
 
11/ISEAL_Standard_Setting_Code_v6_Dec_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/795P-UC9U]; What are 
Credible Sustainability Standards?, supra note 10.  
 52. MSC Standard Setting Procedure, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL (2018), 
https://www.msc.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/msc-standard-setting-
procedure.pdf [https://perma.cc/KX4Q-VEHT]. 
 53. FSC-STD-60-006: Process Requirements for the Development and Maintenance of 
National Forest Stewardship Standards, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL (2009), 
https://ic.fsc.org/en/document-center/id/88 [https://perma.cc/4S9X-URT3].  
 54. Light & Orts, supra note 20, at 1; Light & Vandenbergh, supra note 20.  
 55. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Johnathan A. Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, 40 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 217, 264–65 (2015) (discussing how environmental advocacy groups targeted major 
banks with naming-and-shaming campaigns). 
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and cultural organizations). Funding for private governance initiatives 
is often provided by one or more philanthropic organizations, and an 
ongoing funding mechanism is often incorporated into the certification 
process. A core vulnerability of these systems is that the source of initial 
or ongoing funding can compromise the independence of the 
organization. Once the standards and certification organization is 
established and standards are in place, the organization may induce 
compliance by harnessing the same market and social forces that were 
used to form the organization.  
In many cases these private initiatives may steer behavior even 
when governments are unable to act because it is often easier for 
individuals to express their preferences through market and social 
mechanisms than through formal democratic processes. For instance, it 
may be easier for consumers to choose between two stores at the same 
shopping center, two goods on the same shelf, or two investment options 
for retirement funds than it is to vote, call a legislator, or contribute to 
a candidate. Not surprisingly, in many of the areas in which private 
governance initiatives have arisen, government actions or failures to 
act have been out of sync with the preferences of a large segment of the 
population (e.g., gun control, animal welfare, climate mitigation). 
Market and social pressure can be stimulated at low cost by 
nongovernmental organizations (e.g., advocacy groups, service groups, 
and civic, cultural and religious organizations) because new 
technologies and social media facilitate the ability of these 
organizations to gather, process, and spread information. For instance, 
a cell phone can scan products in a grocery store to reveal everything 
from the environmental footprint of the good to health and safety 
information.56 Individuals may use the information not only to affect 
retail purchases, but also investments, decisions about where to work, 
and other actions.  
Although most consumers in the United States are not willing 
to pay a premium for green goods, they will often opt for green goods 
over others if the price is comparable.57 In addition, although the effects 
of reputation on corporate behavior are difficult to study, many 
corporate actions regarding fisheries, forests, climate, and other issues 
may be driven more by concern about corporate brand than by specific 
 
 56. See, e.g., GOODGUIDE, https://www.goodguide.com/#/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/5DKM-ALKW] (rating over seventy-five thousand products based on their health 
and safety characteristics). 
 57. See Mark Cohen & Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Potential Role of Carbon Labeling in a 
Green Economy, 34 ENERGY ECON. S53, S55–S56 (2012) (reviewing market studies). 
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consumer choices.58 Firms are keen to develop and protect their 
reputation out of concern that consumers will not even consider buying 
their products if they have a negative view of the firm’s brand.59 Thus, 
even if direct consumer behavior change does not drive the behavior of 
the major retail firms that spend large amounts of advertising dollars, 
brand reputation may have a powerful influence. In addition, niche 
retailers can market to small groups, but large retailers cannot succeed 
unless they can maintain their reputation among a very broad share of 
the population.60 That may explain a wide range of otherwise puzzling 
behavior by firms, such as why a company like Dick’s Sporting Goods 
banned the sale of AR-15 rifles despite strong opposition from gun 
advocates.61  
The magnitude of the pressure from lenders and investors is 
easy to underestimate, but a few examples suggest why this pressure 
may be influencing the behavior of many large corporations. The 
Equator Principles are the most prominent example of the ways in 
which lenders have used their market power regarding environmental 
and climate issues, but lenders are also participating in other similar 
initiatives.62 Equity investors are also playing an important role. For 
instance, investment firms with more than $100 trillion in assets under 
management are part of the CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure 
Project), which encourages companies to disclose and reduce carbon 
emissions. The largest institutional investment firm in the world, 
BlackRock, has adopted a low-carbon policy and has begun enforcing 
the policy through its investment decisions and proxy voting.63 Many 
 
 58. Sharon Shewmake et al., Carbon Triage: A Strategy for Developing a Viable Carbon 
Labelling System, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION 285, 289 (Lucia A. 
Reisch & John Thøgersen eds., 2015). For overviews of research on corporate reputation, see 
DANIEL DIERMEIER, REPUTATION RULES: STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING YOUR COMPANY’S MOST 
VALUABLE ASSET (2011); and Wayne B. Gray & Jay P. Shimshak, The Effectiveness of 
Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, 5 REV. ENVTL. 
ECON. & POL’Y 3 (2011). 
 59. See sources cited supra note 58.  
 60. Miriam Seifter has noted that civil society is more able to provide checks and balances at 
a national rather than subnational level. Miriam Seifter, Further from the People? The Puzzle of 
State Administration, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 107 (2018). 
 61. See Mystica M. Alexander & Scott R. Thomas, Rogue Retailers or Agents of Necessary 
Change? Using Corporate Policy as a Tool to Regulate Gun Ownership, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 
283 (2018). The desire to appeal to the preferences of the majority or a large plurality of the 
population may also be the motivation for gun control actions by Levi Strauss, see Bhattarai, supra 
note 43, and Nike’s recent advertising campaign focusing on Colin Kaepernick, see Patrick Coffee, 
How Nike’s $6 Billion Colin Kaepernick Campaign Put the Focus Back on Big Creative Ideas, 
ADWEEK (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.adweek.com/agencies/the-big-payback/ [https://perma.cc/ 
QLW6-RPFC]. 
 62. VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 4.  
 63. See Tim Quinn & Lex Suvanto, 10 Signs that Some of the World’s Most Powerful Money 
Managers Are Worrying More About Climate Change, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 7, 2018, 3:59 PM), 
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other institutional investors and pension funds have done the same. In 
addition, recent research suggests that the holdings of the biggest 
institutional investors such as BlackRock, State Street and Vanguard 
are so large and depend so much on gains over the next five to twenty 
years that they have incentives to adopt an economy-wide and long-
term perspective.64 Other investor sectors are engaging in this type of 
behavior as well. For instance, one of the largest private equity firms in 
the United States, the Carlyle Group, has hired a former 
Environmental Defense Fund manager as its Chief Sustainability 
Officer, adopted a policy of carbon neutrality for its operations, and 
committed to drive down the emissions from its portfolio companies.65  
Pressure from lenders and investors may be a contributing 
factor in the rapid uptake of many types of environmental supply-chain 
requirements over the last several decades. Walmart has worked with 
environmental groups such as the Environmental Defense Fund to 
reduce emissions from its suppliers by more than twenty-eight million 
tons and has committed to achieve a billion tons by 2030.66 These are 
only anecdotal examples, but an empirical study of the largest firms in 
each of eight corporate sectors found that over half of the firms in each 
 
https://www.businessinsider.com/vanguard-blackrock-and-exxonmobil-worry-about-climate-
change-2018-2 [https://perma.cc/3KU4-RZGG] (noting that BlackRock “listed climate risk 
disclosure practices among its top ‘engagement priorities’ ”); Reuters, BlackRock Says Investors 
Need to Assess Climate Change When Investing, FORTUNE (Sept. 6, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/09/06/blackrock-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/EU7T-DZQW]; see also 
Press Release, The Carlyle Grp., The Carlyle Group Releases 2018 Corporate Citizenship Report 
(June 12, 2018), https://www.carlyle.com/media-room/news-release-archive/carlyle-group-
releases-2018-corporate-citizenship-report [https://perma.cc/KG6W-AX5V] (announcing that The 
Carlyle Group, a private equity firm, is carbon neutral). Similarly, seventy-four percent of the U.S. 
population supports legal status for illegal immigrants brought to the United States as children, 
yet it was universities and employers that took action to protect Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals recipients. Maria Sacchetti, University, Employers Scramble to Protect DACA Recipients, 
CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 23, 2018, 1:08 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-university-
employers-protect-daca-recipients-20180223-story.html [https://perma.cc/TNW7-VS4A]; Alec 
Tyson, Public Backs Legal Status for Immigrants Brought to U.S. Illegally as Children, but Not a 
Bigger Border Wall, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 19, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/01/19/public-backs-legal-status-for-immigrants-brought-to-u-s-illegally-as-children-
but-not-a-bigger-border-wall/ [https://perma.cc/8UCN-TUVU]. 
 64. Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2020); Jon D. Harford, Firm Ownership Patterns and Motives for Voluntary Pollution Control, 18 
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 421 (1997). 
 65. Press Release, supra note 63. 
 66. Walmart Launches New Reusable Bag Campaign; Announces 93 Million Metric Tons of 
Supplier Emission Reductions through Project Gigaton and Announces New Sustainable Textile 
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sector imposed environmental requirements on suppliers.67 These 
supply-chain restrictions are not mandated by federal, state, or local 
environmental laws, but they enable environmental pressure to be 
transferred to small- and medium-sized firms in the United States and 
around the globe.  
In short, the private governance initiatives that have emerged 
in the last several decades demonstrate that private organizations are 
performing many types of governmental functions. These organizations 
often develop as a result of shared interests among advocacy groups and 
corporations, with seed funding from philanthropists. The 
organizations enforce their standards through informal and formal 
market and social pressure, and they include several common design 
elements. Although the research base is thin, studies suggest that these 
organizations often succeed at shifting the behavior of their regulatory 
targets.68 Whether they achieve their ultimate objectives (e.g., 
improving environmental conditions, labor conditions, or prices paid to 
farmers for fair trade goods) is less well understood, but it is important 
to note that the same can be said for many government programs on the 
same topics. Private systems can become captured by economic, social, 
or political interests, but the important question for this Essay is 
whether a private fairness doctrine can be developed that is sufficiently 
influential to shift the behavior of media firms and sufficiently 
accountable to a broad group of stakeholders to avoid capture by narrow 
interests. I explore these issues in Parts II and III.  
II. INFORMATION PROBLEMS 
A private fairness doctrine is important because concerns exist 
not only about the ability of government to perform the traditional 
functions assigned to governments (e.g., providing public goods and 
reducing negative externalities), but also about the health of basic 
democratic processes.69 The flow of information is perhaps the most 
 
 67. Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in 
Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913 (2007); see also Rory Van Loo, The New Gatekeepers: 
Private Firms as Public Enforcers, 106 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (noting the extent to which 
government statutes and regulations require enforcement through private supply-chain 
contracts). 
 68. See TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 17.  
 69. Yascha Mounk, America Is Not a Democracy, ATLANTIC (Mar. 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/03/america-is-not-a-democracy/550931/ 
[https://perma.cc/BXZ2-VEJF]. The moderate-to-conservative Democratic Blue Dog Coalition once 
had fifty-four members and now only has twenty-five. Andrew Kacynzki & Christopher Massie, 
Arizona Senate: Krysten Sinema’s Anti-war Group Blasted ‘U.S. Terror,’ Depicted Soldier as 
Skeleton in 2003 Flyers, CNN (Sept. 15, 2018, 4:41 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/15/ 
politics/kfile-sinema-flyers/index.html [https://perma.cc/JW63-HY86]; Members, BLUE DOG 
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fundamental process for a successful democracy. Social, market, and 
legal developments over the last several decades have distorted the flow 
of information in a variety of ways that undermine opportunities for 
informed policymaking. I focus on two developments that contribute to 
the information problem and may be amenable to a new private 
response: (1) the channelization of information flow through traditional 
and new media firms and the effects of this channelization on 
polarization and social checks and balances, and (2) the withdrawal of 
the federal government from even the most basic policing of the flow of 
information conveyed by the media.   
Channelized Information Flow. The first development arises 
from the shifting structure and motivations of traditional and new 
media. Adequate information is essential for democratic participation 
and deliberation, but there is a growing recognition that the flow of 
politically relevant information in the United States is flawed.70 In a 
world in which government checks and balances are the principal focus, 
government censorship of the media is a core concern. Of course, the 
Framers’ response was the First Amendment, which is designed to 
encourage uninhibited and robust debate by imposing constraints on 
the ability of governments, not private organizations, to restrict free 
speech.71 The assumption is that lack of government constraints on 
speech will yield an informed, participatory public citizenry and 
adequate information for politicians and other policymakers.72  
The assumption underlying this approach to free speech is that 
multiple tongues will reach multiple ears.73 But what happens if they 
do not? What happens if those ears can be closed to all tongues other 
than those with prescreened messages? In recent years, the flow of 
information has been distorted in ways that undermine opportunities 
for informed democratic discourse across deeply held worldviews. In 
1980, three major networks dominated television, and a small number 
of national broadcast networks dominated radio as well. (Newspaper 
content was less concentrated, but newspapers had widespread 
 
COALITION, https://bluedogcaucus-costa.house.gov/members (last visited Apr. 1, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/7Q92-CVBZ] (listing members of the Blue Dog Coalition). 
 70. See generally SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC, supra note 1 (discussing how the channelization of 
information flows has become pervasive in the last several decades). For a recent discussion in the 
mass media, see Lepore, supra note 13.  
 71. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (Brennan, J.). 
 72. As Justice Brennan stated, “The First Amendment must therefore safeguard not only the 
right of the public to hear debate, but also the right of individuals to participate in that debate and 
to attempt to persuade others to their points of view.” Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic 
Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 193 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 73. As Judge David Bazelon noted, “The wisdom of the First Amendment is, however, that a 
multitude of tongues will produce the diversity of ideas and artistic achievement we all desire.” 
David L. Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213, 241. 
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readership across the political spectrum in many communities.) In 
short, television and radio stations were owned by many different 
parties, but a small group of broadcasting firms dominated the field. 
The concentration among broadcasters raised concerns about private 
censorship.74 To succeed, though, these broadcast networks needed to 
appeal to widespread audiences. In turn, this motivated broadcasters 
to convey information that not only might be homogenized or dumbed 
down, but also that could withstand scrutiny from and attract a broad 
audience. In other words, broadcast firms had incentives to integrate 
the views of and retain the credibility of many people across the political 
spectrum.75  
This had all changed by the late 1990s, when Fox News and 
MSNBC were commanding a substantial share of the national 
audience. The growth of cable television, satellite radio, and other 
options enabled the traditional media firms to generate a large number 
of information pathways or channels. The new channels often targeted 
self-selected subgroups and only reached large audiences in the 
aggregate. In contrast, between 1980 and 2005, the share of the 
television market reached by the nightly news of the three major 
networks that ostensibly attempted to reach a general audience fell 
from 42.3 million to 18.9 million.76 The result is that many media firms 
faced little incentive to generate or provide content that could survive 
scrutiny from or appeal to a wider audience.77   
 
 74. See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. 
REV. 1641 (1967) [hereinafter Barron, Access to the Press] (arguing that First Amendment theory 
must be reexamined to respond to mass media’s repression of ideas); see also Jerome A. Barron, 
Access to the Media—A Contemporary Appraisal, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 937, 938 (2007) [hereinafter 
Barron, Access to the Media] (stating that in his 1967 article he “wanted the law to respond to the 
reality of private censorship by affording opportunities for access and reply”). 
 75. Jill LePore’s work suggests that the period of low polarization after the Second World 
War was an anomaly. See LEPORE, supra note 2, at 545–46 (noting higher levels of polarization 
eventually followed Truman’s election). The difference now, though, is that many of the other 
institutions and opportunities for interactions have diminished or become polarized as well. For a 
discussion of the pervasive polarization in the United States today, see generally TALISSE, supra 
note 2.  
 76. Network Evening News Ratings, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 13, 2006), 
http://www.journalism.org/numbers/network-evening-news-ratings/ [https://perma.cc/CC9S-
JTS4]; see also Evening News Viewership, All Networks, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 12, 2007), 
http://www.journalism.org/numbers/evening-news-viewership-all-networks/ 
[https://perma.cc/5JHP-FCB5] (showing network evening news viewership has declined from 52.1 
million in 1980 to 26.1 million in 2006). 
 77. See Philip Bump, How Polarization and Splintered Media Are Fostering a World of Doubt, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/11/13/how-
polarization-and-splintered-media-are-fostering-a-world-of-doubt/ [https://perma.cc/FLU8-UQSU] 
(explaining that Fox News’s ratings have improved largely due to its reembrace of partisan 
politics).  
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By 2010, the development of the internet and social media had 
reinforced the tendency toward tailored information flows. The growth 
of new media giants reduced the number of firms that provide pathways 
for information (e.g., Facebook, Google, and Twitter),78 leading to 
censorship concerns.79 Although the concentration of these firms poses 
risks of private censorship, an equal or greater concern is that these 
firms enable users to avoid exposure to opinions and assertions of fact 
that are inconsistent with the users’ worldview. Participants can speak 
all they want but also can insulate themselves from inconvenient views. 
This undermines debate, deliberation, and compromise. Facebook, 
Google, Twitter, and other firms that serve as information conduits to 
general audiences can affect this flow of information and are thus 
subject to pressure from all sides. Not surprisingly, these firms have 
struggled to develop and implement corporate content standards and 
implementing systems.80 
In short, although information sources have become more 
numerous, they also have become more tailored to specific audiences. 
 
 78. See generally Barron, Access to the Media, supra note 74 (reflecting on the advent of the 
internet and its significance for private rights of access). The Fairness Doctrine may serve as a 
useful analogy in imagining a solution to this issue. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 
400–01 (1969) (holding the doctrine constitutional because it was in the public interest to promote 
access to scarce radio frequencies); Jerome A. Barron, The Federal Communications Commission’s 
Fairness Doctrine: An Evaluation, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1961); Jerome A. Barron, In Defense 
of “Fairness”: A First Amendment Rationale for Broadcasting’s “Fairness” Doctrine, 37 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 31 (1964) (concluding that the Fairness Doctrine “represents a modest attempt to 
affirmatively structure at least one communications medium so that the first amendment mandate 
is not allowed to become, due to rapid economic and technological change, irrelevant”); Roscoe L. 
Barrow, The Fairness Doctrine: A Double Standard for Electronic and Print Media, 26 HASTINGS 
L.J. 659 (1975) (assessing the different applications of the Fairness Doctrine between broadcast 
and print media); Louis L. Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on 
Fairness and Access, 85 HARV. L. REV. 768 (1972) (arguing that the fairness and access doctrines, 
while beneficial, must be limited to avoid impinging on other important values); Thomas G. 
Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., The Fairness Doctrine Today: A Constitutional Curiosity and an 
Impossible Dream, 1985 DUKE L.J. 151 (concluding that the Fairness Doctrine is incoherent and 
unworkable). 
 79. For instance, Jerome Barron has stated that “given contemporary anemic views of what 
constitutes state action, the major Internet service providers have enormous discretion. . . . Should 
the very small number of companies that own major Internet platforms and search engines be 
viewed as state actors so that they will be subject to First Amendment restraints?” Barron, Access 
to the Media, supra note 74, at 953. 
 80. For a discussion of these struggles, see Klonick, supra note 14. The content policies of 
Twitter and Facebook are a form of self-regulation. See id. at 1599. The private fairness doctrine 
would be a form of private governance, not self-regulation, however, because it would involve 
private standards that are developed and enforced by third parties, not simply the internal policies 
of a firm. Controversy over Facebook’s decision not to ban false political advertisements is just one 
example of the difficulty new media firms are confronting as they develop self-regulatory policies. 
See Craig Timberg, Tony Romm & Drew Harwell, A Facebook Policy Lets Politicians Lie in Ads, 
Leaving Democrats Fearing What Trump Will Do, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/10/facebook-policy-political-speech-lets-
politicians-lie-ads/ [https://perma.cc/PLD6-GDZT]. 
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Information is generated and flows not to general audiences, but 
instead is generated to appeal to a specific group and is conveyed to that 
group, often without easy access by others outside the group.81 As new 
forms of communication have developed, the number of avenues 
through which media companies can reach audiences has exploded, 
leading to a market in which media organizations with an explicit 
ideological agenda have substantially increased their share of the 
audience. Individuals can now insulate themselves from facts and 
opinions that are inconsistent with their worldview, preselecting the 
information they want to be exposed to, and perhaps more importantly, 
the information they want to ignore.82 This channelization of 
information flow also undermines the need for reporters, editors, and 
other content providers to account for reactions and fact checking from 
a broad audience.  
The channelization of information works in tandem with several 
aspects of human psychology to facilitate political polarization.83 For 
instance, individuals engage in confirmation bias and motivated 
reasoning, picking those sources of information and factual assertions 
that fit with their worldview and tossing out those that do not.84 These 
processes even affect how individuals experience the surroundings of 
their daily lives—conservatives in rural northern New England believe 
that recent winters have been colder than they have been, making it 
easier to dismiss concerns about climate change.85 In theory, interacting 
with others who have different viewpoints could ameliorate this 
problem, but increasingly in the United States individuals only 
 
 81. See Natalie Jomini Stroud, Polarization and Partisan Selective Exposure, 60 J. COMM. 
556, 556 (2010) (discussing how “people purposefully select information matching their viewpoints” 
and tend to be attracted to sources of media that align with their opinions). 
 82. See Bump, supra note 77 (analyzing the growth of political polarization in conjunction 
with the splintering of media sources); Stroud, supra note 81, at 556–57 (examining the effects of 
partisan selective exposure on political polarization and vice versa); Amy Mitchell et al., Political 
Polarization & Media Habits, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 21, 2014), 
http://www.journalism.org/2014/10/21/political-polarization-media-habits/ 
[https://perma.cc/VY85-B8H5] (surveying the media consumption habits of people on different 
ends of the political spectrum). 
 83. For an overview of these phenomena regarding acceptance of climate science, see 
generally VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 4.  
 84. See id. at 9.  
 85. See Lawrence C. Hamilton et al., Cold Winters Warming? Perceptions of Climate Change 
in the North Country, 10 WEATHER, CLIMATE, & SOC’Y 641, 646 (2018) (showing that Democrats, 
Independents, and non–Tea Party Republicans recognize winter warming while Tea Party 
members do not); see also Elke U. Weber, Perception and Expectation of Climate Change, in 
ENVIRONMENT, ETHICS, AND BEHAVIOR 314, 318–38 (Max H. Bazerman et al. eds., 1997) (studying 
Iowan farmers and finding those that believed in global warming “tended to cite more sources as 
having influenced their opinion than those who did not”). 
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associate—both physically and electronically—with similar others.86 In 
turn, associating with similar others reinforces and increases extreme 
views, and research shows that people engage in belief superiority: the 
more extreme their views, the more they think their views are superior 
to others.87 
Polarization. Not surprisingly, polarization has increased in 
recent years both in the general population and among politicians. The 
literature on polarization is extensive, but one example demonstrates 
the extent of the difference between Democrats and Republicans in 
Congress. Sociologist Aaron McCright and colleagues have examined 
the League of Conservation Voters (“LCV”) scores of members of 
Congress regarding important environmental issues over the last 
several decades, and the results are striking: in the years following 
1990, a massive gap opened up in the LCV scores of Democrats and 
Republicans.88 Although polarization was always a feature of 
environmental voting in Congress, the gap expanded rapidly after 1992 
and is now almost at its maximum possible extent.89 Similar analyses 
have been conducted on issues ranging from healthcare, to choice or 
abortion, to gun control.90  
The gap between Democrats and Republicans undermines the 
ability to share information and form policy compromises.91 For 
instance, in the environmental field, almost two dozen major pollution 
control statutes were adopted through the Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1990, but that process largely ground to a halt as polarization 
increased during the 1990s, and in the quarter century since 1990 only 
 
 86. See generally TALISSE, supra note 2 (discussing growing polarization across multiple 
domains in the United States).  
 87. See Kaitlin Toner, Mark R. Leary, Michael W. Asher & Katrina P. Jongman-Sereno, 
Feeling Superior Is a Bipartisan Issue: Extremity (Not Direction) of Political Views Predicts 
Perceived Belief Superiority, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 2454, 2459 (2013) (“[P]eople at the extremes of the 
political spectrum felt most superior about their beliefs.”). 
 88. See McCright et al., supra note 3, at 252–53 (illustrating the widening partisan divide in 
environmental voting scores).  
 89. See id. 
 90. See, e.g., Edward G. Carmines, Jessica C. Gerrity & Michael W. Wagner, How Abortion 
Became a Partisan Issue: Media Coverage of the Interest Group‐Political Party Connection, 38 POL. 
& POL’Y 1135, 1135–36 (2010) (analyzing the increase in the partisan divide over abortion); Frank 
Newport & Andrew Dugan, Partisan Differences Growing on a Number of Issues, GALLUP (Aug. 3, 
2017), https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/215210/partisan-differences-growing-
number-issues.aspx [https://perma.cc/A4U9-E8M4]. 
 91. See Sarah A. Binder, The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947–96, 93 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 519, 521 (1999) (“The broader the distribution of preferences, the greater the likelihood that 
legislators’ goals will be incompatible, or at least the more difficult it will be to reach a suitable 
compromise.”). 
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one major pollution control statute has been adopted.92 Other factors 
certainly played a role in this legislative gridlock, but polarization was 
an important factor.93 
Social Checks and Balances. Scholars have noted the importance 
of social checks and balances for some time, but the term has been used 
in a narrow sense to refer to the constraints on politicians, party 
leaders, and other active participants in the political process arising 
from norms of fair play. For instance, in the 1950s, political scientist 
Robert Dahl emphasized the importance of social influences but noted 
that “[b]ecause we are taught to believe in the necessity of 
constitutional checks and balances, we place little faith in social checks 
and balances.”94 Recent scholarship has focused on the importance of 
parties rather than branches of government in the constitutional 
system of checks and balances,95 but the growing party-based 
polarization has also undermined social checks and balances. As Dahl 
noted, “In the absence of certain social prerequisites, no constitutional 
arrangements can produce a non-tyrannical republic,” and “an increase 
in the extent to which one of the social prerequisites is present may be 
 
 92. Vandenbergh, supra note 8, at 131; see Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Lamarck Revisited: 
The Implications of Epigenetics for Environmental Law, 7 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 28–29 
(2017) (discussing the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 
114-182, 130 Stat. 448 (2016)).  
 93. Binder, supra note 91, at 527. 
 94. DAHL, supra note 5, at 83. As Dahl noted, Madison “was not indifferent to the necessary 
social conditions for his non-tyrannical republic. But surely it is not unfair to say that his primary 
concern was with prescribed constitutional controls . . . with constitutional checks and balances 
rather than social checks and balances.” Id. at 82. According to Dahl, “The men at the Convention 
took human nature and social structure largely for granted; their job, as they interpreted it, was 
to create a constitution most fully consonant both with human nature and social structure . . . .” 
Id. In Federalist 51, Madison stated:  
A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but 
experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. This policy of 
supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced 
through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it 
particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant 
aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a 
check on the other—that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over 
the public rights.  
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2016). Although Madison 
seemed to understand the role of checks and balances in each sphere (public and private), as Dahl 
noted he did not focus on the extent to which the one sphere (private) can contribute checks and 
balances to the other (public). DAHL, supra note 5, at 83.  
 95. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 2312, 2312–14 (2006). While the experience with one-party control of Congress and the White 
House during the January 2017 to January 2019 period was consistent with the parties-not-powers 
thesis, institutional loyalties may play a greater role than Levinson and Pildes acknowledged, 
particularly in executive-judicial branch interactions. See David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, 
Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1–10 (2018) (noting that recent 
scholarship gives the idea of institutional loyalties short shrift).  
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far more important in strengthening democracy than any particular 
constitutional design.”96 In his writing about social checks and 
balances, Dahl focused on the importance of the widely shared norms of 
the active participants in the political process: politicians, party 
leaders, and to a lesser extent, voters. For instance, politicians in the 
two major parties understood that they would be in and out of power 
with one another, and this iterative process induced a tacit agreement 
not to overreach or manipulate certain rules when in power.97 These 
informal understandings were certainly not followed in all cases, but 
they constrained the behavior of many of the politicians and other 
participants in the political process. As a result, even in a government 
of parties, not powers, Dahl’s social checks and balances buttressed the 
democratic processes institutionalized by the Framers.98   
In their simplest form, social checks and balances arise from the 
enforcement of personal and social norms. In Dahl’s use of the term 
social checks and balances, this social pressure occurs among the active 
participants in the political process—such as politicians and party 
activists. Informal, noninstitutionalized social pressure arises when 
 
 96. DAHL, supra note 5, at 83. In developing his theory of polyarchy, Dahl asserted that 
“[w]hether we are concerned with tyranny by a minority or tyranny by a majority, . . . the first and 
crucial variables to which political scientists must direct their attention are social and not 
constitutional.” Id. 
 97. Id. Dahl used the term “social checks and balances” in his explanation of his theory of 
polyarchy, but he focused principally on how social and personal norms among the participants in 
the political process (e.g., common practices or informal rules about fair play in elections held by 
politicians, party officials, and others) affect the structure and function of the branches of 
government. See ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION (1971) (providing 
an overview of his theory of polyarchy); DONALD J. LEE, POLYARCHY: THE POLITICAL THEORY OF 
ROBERT A. DAHL 13 (1991) (describing the social norm between leaders and nonleaders as a key 
characteristic of polyarchy). I use the term more broadly to also describe how private activity can 
provide social checks and balances that occur among individuals and organizations that operate 
largely outside of and parallel to the political process, rather than among the party leaders, 
politicians, and other direct participants in the political process. 
 98. In recent years, scholars and pundits have noted that democratic personal and social 
norms are an essential complement to institutional structures and may be more fundamental to a 
successful democracy, although the focus has remained principally on the norms of politicians and 
party activists. See, e.g., LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 6, at 9 (describing informal norms as “the 
soft guardrails of democracy”); Claire Cain Miller & Kevin Quealy, Democracy in America: How Is 
It Doing?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/23/upshot/democracy-in-
america-how-is-it-doing.html [https://perma.cc/7RQL-E4FQ] (observing that a survey of political 
scientists suggests that “[t]he areas in which American democracy is failing . . . concerned civil 
behavior. This involved norms that elected majorities should act with restraint and reciprocity, 
that politicians should campaign without disparaging their opponents’ patriotism or loyalty, and 
that public officials should recognize bureaucratic or scientific consensus.”); Fareed Zakaria, 
Opinion, America’s Democracy Has Become Illiberal, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/america-is-becoming-a-land-of-less-liberty/2016/12/29/ 
2a91744c-ce09-11e6-a747-d03044780a02_story.html [https://perma.cc/HL3N-U4T3] (concluding 
that “[i]t turns out that what sustains democracy is not simply legal safeguards and rules, but 
norms and practices — democratic behavior”).  
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private citizens praise or shame political figures.99 In the absence of 
adequate information about the behavior of these actors, however, the 
informal social pressure that enforces social checks and balances cannot 
occur. The erosion of social checks and balances can also extend well 
beyond political agendas and can undermine democratic debates and 
actions among the general public.  
The FCC Fairness Doctrine. In addition to the transformation of 
the media over the last several decades, an important development 
regarding the flow of information occurred when the federal 
government withdrew from policing media fairness and accuracy. The 
FCC’s Fairness Doctrine, adopted in 1949 and modified over time, 
required radio and television news outlets to feature opposing 
viewpoints on controversial topics.100 The Fairness Doctrine required 
outlets to devote a reasonable amount of time on the air to controversial 
issues of public importance and to give air time to citizens with 
contrasting perspectives regarding those matters.101 The Doctrine 
included several corollary rules, such as the Cullman rule, which 
necessitated time on the air for individuals with different views on 
controversial issues, even if those individuals could not pay for the 
time.102 The personal attack rule required companies to allow response 
time on the air for individuals or groups whose honesty or character 
was attacked.103 The political editorial rule forced broadcasters who 
endorsed or supported political candidates to give time on the air to 
opposing candidates who wanted to respond.104 As the FCC stated in 
1964, the Fairness Doctrine supplemented the requirement to provide 
 
 99. For an example of informal social checks and balances that have generated substantial 
controversy, see Jess Bidgood & Julie Bosman, On Martha’s Vineyard, a Frosty Summer for Alan 
Dershowitz, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/03/us/marthas-vineyard-
trump.html [https://perma.cc/AE5X-78PR]. 
 100. The first iteration of the Fairness Doctrine appeared in the FCC’s 1949 Report, 
Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1247 (1949). The FCC established 
comprehensive standards in Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of 
Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598 (1964) (discussing equal time and 
editorial reply). The FCC also reviewed programming for balance during licensing proceedings for 
broadcast media stations. See, e.g., Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 278–80, 
278 n.45, 279–80 nn.59–63 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (rehearing en banc) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in the 
result). The FCC applied the Fairness Doctrine “in any case in which broadcast facilities are used 
for the discussion of a controversial issue of public importance.” Applicability of the Fairness 
Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, supra, at 598.  
 101. Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public 
Importance, supra note 100, at 598–99. 
 102. See id. at 609 (“[W]here the licensee . . . has not presented (or does not plan to present) 
contrasting viewpoints in other programming, . . . he cannot reject a presentation otherwise 
suitable to the licensee—and thus leave the public uninformed—on the ground that he cannot 
obtain paid sponsorship for that presentation.”). 
 103. Id. at 610–14. 
 104. Id. at 613–14. 
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opportunities for political candidates to have access to broadcast 
facilities and dealt “with the broader question of affording reasonable 
opportunity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints on 
controversial issues of public importance.”105  
The FCC stated that: 
[A licensee] is called upon to make reasonable judgments in good faith on the facts of each 
situation—as to whether a controversial issue of public importance is involved, as to what 
viewpoints have been or should be presented, as to the format and spokesmen to present 
the viewpoints, and all the other facets of such programming.106  
The FCC also stated that its “role is not to substitute its 
judgment for that of the licensee as to any of the above programming 
decisions, but rather to determine whether the licensee can be said to 
have acted reasonably and in good faith.”107 The FCC did not 
aggressively enforce the Fairness Doctrine requirements in formal 
proceedings, but as Jerome Barron stated, “The very existence of the 
doctrine cautioned against excessive one-sidedness in the presentation 
of public affairs.”108 In addition, as Judge David Bazelon noted in the 
mid-1970s, the FCC frequently enforced the Fairness Doctrine through 
informal “raised eyebrow” communications with media executives.109 
Supporters argued that the Fairness Doctrine was needed to 
prevent a monopoly of ideas controlled by the wealthy, profit-driven 
owners of broadcast stations.110 Courts pointed to the scarcity of 
available bandwidth for television and radio stations, upholding 
challenges to the Fairness Doctrine111 on the theory that absent 
government intervention, scarcity could be monopolized to shut down 
information flow.112 The Supreme Court was vigilant in policing 
government restrictions on print media, but it treated restrictions on 
radio and television stations differently.113 In 1969, the Court upheld 
 
 105. Id. at 599. As Paul Krugman stated in 2002, the Fairness Doctrine “forced broadcast 
media to give comparable representation to opposing points of view.” Paul Krugman, Opinion, In 
Media Res, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/29/opinion/in-media-
res.html [https://perma.cc/ET3M-CVMN]. 
 106. Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public 
Importance, supra note 100, at 599. 
 107. This allows for more licensee discretion under the Fairness Doctrine than under the 
“equal opportunities” requirement. Id.  
 108. Barron, Access to the Media, supra note 74, at 943. 
 109. Bazelon, supra note 73, at 215–17. 
 110. Mark A. Conrad, The Demise of the Fairness Doctrine: A Blow for Citizen Access, 41 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 161, 162 (1989). 
 111. Id. at 188. 
 112. Id. at 181. 
 113. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974), the Supreme Court 
struck down a state fairness law as applied to a newspaper’s coverage on the ground that there 
was not a similar scarcity to radio and television. 
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the Fairness Doctrine in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,114 
advancing the “idea that the First Amendment had an affirmative 
dimension and that law could not only protect freedom of expression but 
facilitate it.”115 Much of the battle over the Fairness Doctrine concerned 
“the idea that a radio or television station had an obligation . . . to 
provide the community it served with a roughly representative 
overview of the issues that beset its audience.”116 In fact, scholars such 
as Barron thought that the Fairness Doctrine did not go far enough. He 
argued that America’s “romantic” First Amendment theory allowed the 
repression of certain ideas to promote others,117 and that because power 
is in the hands of those who control the media,118 Congress should enact 
legislation that would create a right of access to broadcast channels to 
ensure that broadcasters could not arbitrarily deny space to candidates, 
ideas, or groups.119 Other scholars suggested that evidence of any 
chilling effect from the Fairness Doctrine was minimal, anecdotal and 
speculative, and that the doctrine in fact enhanced discourse.120 
Over time, however, the Fairness Doctrine became the 
government constraint that everyone loved to hate.121 It was heavily 
criticized by free-speech advocates, who complained that the doctrine 
chilled national discourse on important issues.122 Many on the right 
 
 114. 395 U.S. 367, 400–01 (1969). 
 115. Barron, Access to the Media, supra note 74, at 938. The Court held that a right of access 
to the media was not necessary in the First Amendment in part because the FCC’s Fairness 
Doctrine was available. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 130–
32 (1973). The Supreme Court has held that there is no right of access to private print media. 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 250–58 (noting that as to concentration of ownership, “[t]he result of these 
vast changes has been to place in a few hands the power to inform the American people and shape 
public opinion”). After Tornillo, fairness concerns led to three types of responses by private media 
companies: press ombudsmen, op-ed pages, and press councils. Barron, Access to the Media, supra 
note 74, at 942–43. 
 116. Barron, Access to the Media, supra note 74, at 944. 
 117. Id. at 1642. 
 118. Id. at 1644. 
 119. See id. at 1678 (arguing that if there is resistance to a judicially created remedy for a 
right of access, then a right of access statute may be enacted to “forbid an arbitrary denial of space” 
and “secur[e] an effective forum for the expression of divergent opinions”). 
 120. See, e.g., Robyn R. Polashuk, Protecting the Public Debate: The Validity of the Fairness 
Doctrine in Ballot Initiative Elections, 41 UCLA L. REV. 391, 435–37 (1993) (noting that “the 
irreconcilable findings” from the FCC and Congress demonstrate that “the evidence of any chilling 
effect created by the Fairness Doctrine is conflicting at best” and observing that “in the context of 
a ballot initiative election, the Fairness Doctrine has enhanced speech by securing coverage of 
points that would not have been presented without the regulatory protections”). 
 121. See, e.g., Adam Thierer, Why the Fairness Doctrine Is Anything but Fair, HERITAGE 
FOUND. (Oct. 29, 1993), https://www.heritage.org/government-regulation/report/why-the-fairness-
doctrine-anything-fair [https://perma.cc/4N5B-83T3]. 
 122. See Dominic E. Markwordt, More Folly than Fairness: The Fairness Doctrine, the First 
Amendment, and the Internet Age, 22 REGENT U. L. REV. 405, 408 (2009) (describing how critics 
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expressed concerns that the doctrine was a way for Democrats to silence 
conservative voices123 in an “Orwellian” fashion.124 Moreover, even after 
Red Lion, critics argued that the Fairness Doctrine created a limitation 
on free expression in violation of the First Amendment.125 Others 
complained that the doctrine was unfair because it targeted broadcast 
news media but did not address other media, such as print.126 Critics of 
the Fairness Doctrine also noted that an important rationale for the 
doctrine was to counter the effect of the concentration of the media 
industry on its ability to exclude unpopular viewpoints, but because a 
large, diverse pool of voices had emerged, scarcity was no longer an 
issue, and there was no way to monopolize the conversation.127 As one 
critic argued, “Whatever strained justification some thought there was 
for the doctrine in 1949 has dissipated with time and the advancement 
of technology. Scarcity has been replaced with 10,000 radio stations and 
more cable channels than there is programming to fill them.”128 
The FCC repealed the Fairness Doctrine in 1987.129 Congress 
attempted to block the FCC’s effort, but President Reagan vetoed the 
legislation,130 and in 2000 the FCC took the additional step of abolishing 
personal attack rules.131 The Fairness Doctrine has been the subject of 
extensive debate since then, and supporters attempted to revive the 
 
“claim that a Democratic Congress and President seek the return of the fairness doctrine to silence 
conservative critics of Congress and the administration”).  
 123. See Roland F.L. Hall, The Fairness Doctrine and the First Amendment: Phoenix Rising, 
45 MERCER L. REV. 705, 705–06 (1994) (noting opponents “call[ed] the Act the ‘Hush Rush’ bill, 
and claim[ed] that a Democratic Congress and President [sought] the return of the fairness 
doctrine to silence conservative critics of Congress and the administration”). 
 124. See Editorial, ‘Fairness’ Is Censorship, WASH. TIMES (June 17, 2008), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jun/17/fairness-is-censorship/ [https://perma.cc/ 
QL6E-TLU9]. 
 125. See Conrad, supra note 110, at 173 (describing how “[t]he uncertainties created by the 
greater number of access claims, coupled with the reverberations from Red Lion” led the FCC to 
compile a comprehensive report on the Fairness Doctrine to assess, in part, whether the Doctrine 
conflicted with the First Amendment).  
 126. See id. at 168 (noting that “print media has never been subject to such content 
regulation”). 
 127. See Thierer, supra note 121 (describing supporters’ argument that “the ‘scarce’ amount of 
spectrum space requires oversight by federal regulators” as a “faulty premise” because the number 
of radio and television stations available today make it “impossible” to “monopolize the airwaves” 
and “deny access to certain viewpoints”).  
 128. Mario M. Cuomo, Opinion, The Unfairness Doctrine, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 1993), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/20/opinion/the-unfairness-doctrine.html [https://perma.cc/ 
3VQU-QK58]. 
 129. Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5057 (1987) (concluding “that the fairness 
doctrine contravenes the First Amendment and thereby disserves the public interest”), enforced, 
867 F.2d 654, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 130. Lepore, supra note 13. 
 131. See Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass’n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269, 272 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
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Doctrine in 1993 and 2008,132 but the Obama Administration ultimately 
eliminated the rule from the Federal Register in 2011.133 Today, the 
FCC only requires media companies to provide political candidates with 
“reasonable access” and “equal opportunities.”134 Supporters of the 
Fairness Doctrine have argued that the FCC’s 1987 decision to repeal 
facilitated the development of media outlets with an explicit policy or 
partisan agenda.135 MSNBC and Fox News were formed in 1996, and 
some have argued that neither could exist under the old Fairness 
Doctrine.136 Similarly, the number of talk radio stations in the United 
States increased from two hundred and forty in 1987 to nine hundred 
in 1992.137 Not all of these new stations focus on polarized political 
audiences, but many do.  
In sum, as a result of the transformation of the media industry 
and the FCC’s actions, the challenge of ensuring adequate information 
for democratic discourse has been turned on its head. The underlying 
vulnerability of the system has shifted from a concern about whether a 
very concentrated industry could manipulate the information it 
provides to a broad audience, to whether a less concentrated group of 
broadcasters and other firms could use multiple information pathways 
to manipulate information by channeling it to multiple narrow 
audiences. This channelization of information is the target of the 
private fairness doctrine initiative proposed in Part III.  
III. A PRIVATE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE 
Is there a cure to the current information problem that is not 
worse than the disease? Private governance initiatives that attempt to 
harness social checks and balances regarding democratic processes are 
less common than private initiatives that target governmental 
functions such as environmental protection and labor standards. This 
is not surprising given that the processes of democracy are at the core 
of what we think of as government, and a major conceptual leap is 
 
 132. See Cuomo, supra note 128 (“Legislation pending in Congress would revive the so-called 
fairness doctrine, which the Federal Communications Commission repealed in 1987.”); ‘Fairness’ 
is Censorship, supra note 124 (“Over the last year, though, top Democrats have said repeatedly 
that they would like to bring the Fairness Doctrine back.”). 
 133. Dylan Matthews, Everything You Need to Know About the Fairness Doctrine in One Post, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/everything-
you-need-to-know-about-the-fairness-doctrine-in-one-post/2011/08/23/gIQAN8CXZJ_blog.html 
[https://perma.cc/WJ79-9Y2J].  
 134. 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(7), 315(a) (2012). 
 135. See Lepore, supra note 13 (“The repeal [of the Fairness Doctrine] . . . made possible a new 
kind of partisan talk radio.”). 
 136. See id.  
 137. Id.  
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required to imagine that private initiatives, rather than only public 
initiatives, could play an important role in this area. To demonstrate 
the possibilities for private initiatives, this Part proposes a private 
effort to develop, administer, and enforce a modern fairness doctrine 
and then discusses objections and extensions.138  
Organizational Structure. A new private-sector initiative could 
draft, publish, administer, enforce, and periodically update the new 
private fairness doctrine. The initiative could follow the pattern of the 
most successful private, collective standard-setting organizations, such 
as the Equator Principles and the MSC. Initial financial support and 
expertise could be provided by philanthropists, journalism institutes, 
media experts, advocacy groups, traditional and new media companies, 
employee organizations, advertisers, investors, and lenders.  
The initial organizers could follow the pattern of other private 
standard-setting bodies by forming a broad stakeholder group to 
oversee the development and implementation of the new standard. The 
now-repealed FCC Fairness Doctrine could serve as the jumping-off 
point for the new private fairness doctrine, with modifications to reflect 
critiques of the 1987 version plus developments in technology and the 
media industry. Although the private effort could evaluate the accuracy 
and completeness of information on an ongoing basis, the task of 
reviewing information daily or even monthly may be overwhelming. A 
more feasible approach would be to conduct an evaluation and 
certification every several years of the processes used by the media 
companies. In other words, the standard could apply to the internal 
rules and processes that a media company uses to generate, screen, 
distribute, update, and correct the information it distributes, along with 
an assessment of the work product from the prior several-year period.  
Private standard setting combined with certification for a period 
of several years is the approach used by the MSC, which periodically 
certifies fisheries and the firms that operate within them. The MSC 
 
 138. For valuable sources on this topic, see ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5Q8B-FU73] (describing itself as 
“[t]he leading nonprofit defending digital privacy, free speech, and innovation”); KNIGHT FIRST 
AMEND. INST. COLUM. U., https://knightcolumbia.org/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/QS5U-VLA7] (providing access to the Institute’s litigation, research, and other 
work). Services such as Poynter are used for fact checking by new media firms. See Fact-Checking, 
POYNTER, https://www.poynter.org/media-news/fact-checking/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/3TYM-D4D7]; Spandada Singh & Kevin Bankston, The Transparency Reporting 
Toolkit: Content Takedown Reporting, NEW AM., https://www.newamerica.org/oti/reports/ 
transparency-reporting-toolkit-content-takedown-reporting/ (last updated Oct. 25, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/P8JY-UM4G] (providing information on “how 35 global internet and 
telecommunications companies report on six categories of content takedowns” and suggesting best 
practices for improving reporting on content practices). For an early exploration of the regulation 
of the internet, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). 
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does not attempt to certify the fish caught by the fishery on an ongoing 
basis.139 Instead, if a firm follows the prescribed methods of fishing 
within that fishery, it can display a label on the packaging of the fish it 
catches from that fishery.140 Similarly, a certified media firm could 
display the logo of the private fairness doctrine organization, providing 
an easy way for investors, lenders, corporate and retail consumers, 
advocacy groups, current employees, and potential job applicants to 
determine which firms they should engage with and which firms they 
should avoid. The most influential users of the certifications would 
likely be major advertisers, who could avoid conflicts among their 
stakeholders about the accuracy and completeness of the information 
conveyed by the media firms they advertise with by announcing that 
they will only advertise with media firms that receive a certification or 
are “A”-rated. The certifications could affect retail consumers if mobile 
phone applications enable customers to shop from retailers who only 
advertise with certified media organizations. Potential viewers could 
also check their phones to evaluate the ratings of the media sources 
when deciding which to use, although this is less likely to be influential 
since many media viewers already select media sources based on the 
worldview or ideology of the media sources. In short, the certification 
could harness market and social forces and become a clear signal of the 
media firm’s social license to operate for the designated period. 
Content of the Standard. Perhaps the most difficult issue is how 
to determine the content of the standard. The heterogeneity of the 
media industry (traditional and new media, etc.) suggests that the 
organization may need to develop general principles plus more specific 
standards that apply to particular sectors. For instance, the standards 
necessary for radio and television may be quite different from the 
standards necessary for internet firms such as Facebook, Google, and 
Twitter. In addition, given the experience with fair trade, organic food, 
and sustainable forestry standards, formation of an initial standard 
may lead to development of competing standards.141 Research suggests 
that this may dilute the effect of private standard setting somewhat but 
is not fatal unless the proliferation of imposter standards ambiguates 
the signal sent by the most credible standards.142  
 
 139. Will Martin, Marine Stewardship Council: A Case Study in Private Environmental 
Standard-Setting, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 10097, 10099 (2014) (noting that instead of setting arbitrary 
requirements, “[t]he MSC program . . . judges a fishery on both the outcomes (environmental 
impacts) and inputs (quality and effectiveness of the management) of the fishing operations”). 
 140. See id. at 10097. 
 141. See, e.g., Carolyn Fischer & Thomas P. Lyon, Competing Environmental Labels, 23 J. 
ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 692, 693 (2014). 
 142. See id.; see also Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. 
L. REV. 349, 358 (1997) (addressing concerns about ambiguation that can undermine 
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As discussed at the outset, the goal would not be to achieve 
balance, a concept that makes little sense for many scientific and 
factual issues, but rather accuracy and completeness. Accuracy and 
completeness in all cases is obviously a nearly impossible task to 
perform, but certification pressure can drive improvements. The 
standard could include provisions addressing the transparency of the 
process used to assess information and the sources of information, and 
nonpartisan or independent reviews of the accuracy and completeness 
of the information conveyed. Private organizations that give 
“pinocchios” for falsehoods or otherwise provide public fact-checking 
functions demonstrate that this type of effort is imperfect but 
possible.143 The private fairness doctrine would combine the assessment 
capabilities of these organizations with the market and social 
enforcement mechanisms used by private certification and standards 
organizations.   
The standard also could follow the lead of the FCC Fairness 
Doctrine and require some form of equal access to the media by 
politicians. Access issues do not appear to be at the core of the current 
information problem, however, and attempting to do too much may 
undermine the feasibility and legitimacy of the initiative. Thus, 
although it is tempting to argue that the standard should require equal 
access, this is not the most important goal.  
Updating of the Standard. The development of new technologies 
and experience with the standard will require updates on a periodic 
basis.144 The ISEAL standards require organizations to use a 
 
communications regarding social norms, as related to individuals’ decisions to obey the law or 
commit crimes). The development of competing standards has occurred in other areas, such as 
sustainable forestry, where an industry-supported standard emerged to compete with a standard 
perceived to be more eco-friendly. If that occurs with a private fairness doctrine—for example, if 
organizations form around standards that are more supported by liberals versus conservatives—
there is a risk that the existence of multiple standards will undermine the effort. See Thomas P. 
Lyon & John W. Maxwell, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Environment: A Theoretical 
Perspective, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 1 (2008) (posing questions about the interactions 
between environmental initiatives taken by companies, private actors, and governmental 
environmental regulation). At the same time, the competition between the standards could bring 
some clarity to the debate over what constitutes accurate or complete information, and it may be 
preferable to the current free-for-all.  
 143. See, e.g., Beyond the Truth-O-Meter, POLITIFACT, https://www.politifact.com/curation/ 
national/archive/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/YA6P-P82D] (assessing the accuracy 
of media stories); FactCheck Posts, FACTCHECK.ORG, https://www.factcheck.org/the-factcheck-
wire/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/DTE4-U3LM] (same); Glenn Kessler, Fact 
Checker: The Truth Behind the Rhetoric, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
checker/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9RR8-LM6D] (giving “pinocchio” ratings for 
false statements in politics). 
 144. For instance, new technologies are on the horizon that are expected to make it essentially 
impossible to determine whether a video has been altered. 
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transparent, open process to set and update private standards.145 
Systems such as the Equator Principles and MSC have used processes 
that include publishing a draft standard, taking comment, revising the 
standard, publicly responding to comments, and publishing a revised 
standard.146 As with these other private standards, the private fairness 
doctrine could be updated periodically through transparent processes 
that are open to public participation.  
Monitoring and Enforcement. The private fairness doctrine 
organization could monitor and certify compliance with the standard, 
or independent auditors could serve this function. The experience of 
certification and standards organizations in the sustainability field 
suggests that the staffing requirements could be substantial for these 
tasks, so the use of third-party auditors may be more feasible.147 If the 
monitoring activities follow the pattern of monitoring in other private 
systems, the independence of these private auditors will be essential, 
and the system cannot allow them to be compromised by funding, 
competence issues, or selection of auditors whose decisions are 
dominated by ideology or worldview.148 The existence of fact-checking 
organizations suggests that norms for auditing information already 
exist in this area, and over time a private auditing field may arise with 
experts and professional norms that provide standards of conduct. The 
professional norms of reporters, editors, and other media professionals 
may also play a role if they are linked to compliance with the private 
fairness doctrine.   
The FCC used its radio and television licensing authority as 
leverage for imposing the federal Fairness Doctrine, but that option is 
obviously not available for a private standard. Experience with many 
types of private governance systems, though, suggests that 
nonregulatory influences can be very powerful. A media firm that is 
certified by the private fairness doctrine organization could receive 
preferences from advertisers, lenders, shareholders, supply-chain 
contractors, and retail customers, and those firms that fail to qualify 
could face sanctions ranging from retail consumer boycotts, to investor 
divestment or pressure, to naming-and-shaming efforts that target 
 
 145. See discussion supra note 51. 
 146. See The Equator Principles: June 2006, supra note 49; MSC Standard Setting Procedure, 
supra note 52. 
 147. See Vandenbergh, supra note 8. 
 148. One outcome of the private fairness doctrine may be that many of the mainstream 
organizations, even if they tilt heavily to the left or right, find ways to achieve a certification from 
the organization, but the effort may still play an important role if it discourages outliers whose 
reports have little claim to accuracy or completeness. Some organizations may perceive the failure 
to achieve a certification as a badge of honor, but so long as these are outliers who only appeal to 
small constituencies, they should not undermine the overall effect of the private fairness doctrine.  
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media shareholders and managers. In addition, professional norms 
could induce the most talented journalists and other media employees 
to opt to work for certified media firms, leading media firms to seek 
certification to improve employee recruitment and retention.  
Objections. Any intervention of this type poses risks, but the 
proper standard for judging this initiative is not how it compares to 
ideal alternatives but how it compares to likely or feasible 
alternatives.149 In the case of the Fairness Doctrine, there are two likely 
alternatives: revival of government regulation or continued muddling 
through without any systematic, accountable oversight. The first option 
is highly unlikely, and if it occurs, it may be worse than the current 
situation. If one of the problems with government checks and balances 
is one-party control of government, government intervention in the 
media may make matters worse. For instance, in response to anger 
about the information being provided to viewers via new media, at least 
one close associate of President Trump threatened to nationalize 
companies such as Google and Facebook.150  
The second option—continued lack of any systemic public or 
private oversight—is probably more likely, but it comes at a price. 
Democratic government is difficult in the best of all worlds, but when 
large segments of the population are not exposed to core facts or are 
taught to dismiss them, the ability to choose among politicians and 
policy options and to reach compromises based on those facts is a 
fraught process. Inaccurate and incomplete information may contribute 
to erosion of the social checks and balances that might otherwise induce 
politicians to abide by basic rules of fair play while in office. 
Channelized information flow may also make the political process more 
vulnerable to foreign government interventions by simplifying the 
targeting necessary to promote polarization and undermining the 
ability to find common ground on important issues. Although private 
efforts directed at the media have proliferated on the left and right, 
including efforts to shame or boycott media companies based on the 
perceived accuracy or fairness of the information they distribute, these 
 
 149. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Gilligan & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Accounting for Political 
Feasibility in Climate Instrument Choice, 32 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2014) (discussing the standards 
for reviewing public and private policy alternatives with respect to climate instrument choice). 
 150. See Tina Nguyen, Steve Bannon Wants to Nationalize Facebook and Google’s Data, 
VANITY FAIR (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/08/steve-bannon-big-data-
facebook-twitter-google [https://perma.cc/Y6WV-GSW5]; see also Adi Robertson, Trump Says 
Google, Twitter, and Facebook Are on ‘Troubled Territory’ and ‘Better be Careful,’ VERGE (Aug. 28, 
2018, 3:50 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/8/28/17792764/trump-google-rigged-search-
results-claim-response [https://perma.cc/TS88-VXY6] (discussing President Trump’s “veiled 
threats toward Google and other web platforms,” which followed the President’s tweet about how 
“Google had ‘rigged’ its search results to suppress positive news about him”). 
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efforts have been largely ad hoc and have had mixed success thus far. 
In addition, the experience of new media firms suggests that the design 
and implementation of corporate content policies is occurring, but it is 
proceeding in a nontransparent, unaccountable fashion that has 
satisfied few observers.151 
Content Challenges. Private initiatives such as the MSC have 
been able to develop standards in part because they are grounded in 
science-based concepts. Although deep disagreement exists at the 
margins, the number of fish that can be caught annually from a fishery 
without impairing its yield in future years is a knowable fact, subject to 
measurement and testing. The same is true for forest harvesting, palm 
oil harvesting, labor standards, and other areas that have been the 
subject of extensive private initiatives. Assessing accuracy and 
completeness on hotly contested social and political issues is 
undoubtedly more difficult. A private standard for the media faces both 
theoretical and practical concerns, but some organizations already 
appear to be successfully assessing factual statements for veracity, and 
these organizations could be included in the effort. At a minimum, their 
experiences could inform the development of a new private fairness 
doctrine.  
In addition, the fairness doctrine organization would not focus 
on any one statement, but instead would examine whether the media 
firm had adopted and implemented the systems necessary to screen out 
false statements or situations in which a lack of complete treatment of 
facts would make the media coverage misleading. The process may 
include review of specific articles, advertisements, or news accounts. At 
the same time, the focus on the media firms’ systems, not any particular 
piece of information, might avoid some of the difficulties of assessing 
facts on complex or controversial issues.    
Accountability. Would a private fairness doctrine be sufficiently 
accountable to the public? Would it be commandeered by a particular 
market, social, or political actor? Accountability in this situation refers 
to the accountability of the private fairness doctrine organization to the 
public. The lack of a direct, formal democratic accountability 
mechanism could lead to an initiative that is detached from majority 
preferences, suppresses important minority interests, or otherwise does 
not serve public purposes. A comprehensive accountability analysis is 
beyond the scope of this Essay, but it would include identifying who 
should be accountable to whom, the actors who could ensure 
 
 151. See Romm, supra note 14 (describing Facebook’s plan to create “an independent oversight 
board to review the company’s decisions about the posts, photos and videos it takes down or leaves 
online, responding to a wave of criticism that inconsistent policies have undermined the platform”).  
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accountability, and the methods to achieve accountability.152 For my 
purposes here, I simply argue that the relative differences in 
accountability between a private system and our current government 
system are disturbingly small. A private system would not be subject to 
many of the accountability features of the democratic process—such as 
voting and the full range of public checks and balances—and it may be 
vulnerable to capture by commercial or ideological interests. Private 
governance systems have developed many ways to ensure 
accountability, however, and many of these concerns can be addressed 
by creating an open, broad-based oversight process for the initiative.  
Demand. Perhaps the most fundamental objection to a private 
fairness doctrine is that insufficient demand may exist for greater 
accuracy and completeness of the information that flows from 
traditional and new media. Are enough managers of advocacy groups, 
other organizations, and members of the general public dissatisfied 
with the status quo to demand and invest in an alternative? Does 
sufficient perceived need exist to motivate the core stakeholders who 
are necessary to fund, adopt, monitor, and enforce the standard? If the 
initiative does not include a real or implied threat from a sufficiently 
broad or strong group of private enforcers, it will not succeed, and it is 
possible that only a small group of centrists will join those at the far 
ends of the spectrum, or that two partisan standards, one on the left, 
and one on the right, will emerge. The private fairness doctrine effort 
could start modestly, though, and focus initially on an area with 
significant support across the political spectrum, such as policies 
directed at new media companies.153   
Importance. On a related note, it is possible that the flow of 
accurate, complete information is not an important problem. For 
instance, inadequate information may not be a substantial contributor 
to the polarization problem, or polarization may not be a fundamental 
problem for the functioning of U.S. democracy. Although I discuss these 
issues above, it is beyond the scope of this Essay to address them in any 
detail. From my perspective, though, information problems are a 
sufficient challenge to the ability of the democratic process to generate 
a public-regarding government to warrant a substantial response. In 
addition, the other options are implausible or unattractive. The FCC 
could adopt a modern version of the Fairness Doctrine,154 but this option 
seems dead in the water politically. The FCC recently rejected net 
 
 152. For a discussion of accountability concepts for private governance, see Vandenbergh, 
supra note 67, at 956–63.  
 153. See Klonick, supra note 14, at 1601. 
 154. Efforts to revive the Doctrine in 1993 and 2008 failed, and the Obama Administration 
ultimately eliminated the rule from the Federal Register in 2011. Matthews, supra note 133. 
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neutrality, a form of protection for the flow of information via the 
internet, and adoption of a new Fairness Doctrine is even more difficult 
to envision. Government restriction of free speech raises legal and 
policy concerns from across the political spectrum, so change of control 
of the executive branch is unlikely to have a substantial effect on the 
FCC’s appetite for a new government Fairness Doctrine. Similarly, 
although surveys suggest that the public supports government 
requirements for balanced commentary, the support does not extend to 
internet-based communications.155 
Greater use of private initiatives could also lead to greater, 
rather than less, polarization and self-sorting in the population. For 
example, private initiatives on the left and the right could just infect 
nonpartisan areas of daily life with partisan tribalism and reduce 
dialogue across groups. If conservatives eat at Chick-fil-A while liberals 
eat at the local organic restaurant, and outdoor enthusiasts choose 
between Dick’s Sporting Goods and competitors based on their policies 
regarding the sales of assault weapons, polarization could be 
exacerbated. Demographic trends in the United States already suggest 
that a fair amount of self-sorting is occurring, with Democrats tending 
to live near other Democrats and Republicans living near other 
Republicans.156 If they also tend to shop differently as a result of this 
initiative, that could undermine the efficacy of the initiative and 
exacerbate other effects of polarization. The existence of retailers, 
institutional investors, and other firms that need to reach a very broad 
audience suggests that this is a small risk, but it is a concern that is 
worthy of additional research and thought in the design of any private 
initiative.   
Vulnerability to Manipulation. Another concern with any 
private system is that market or social influences could yield a private 
governance system that serves narrow interests. The standard would 
 
 155. For instance, a 2008 national survey of one thousand likely voters by Rasmussen Reports 
found that forty-seven percent of those surveyed answered “yes” to the question, “Should the 
government require all radio and television stations to offer equal amounts of conservative and 
liberal political commentary?” 47% Favor Government Mandated Political Balance on Radio, TV, 
RASMUSSEN REP. (Aug. 14, 2008), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/ 
general_politics/august_2008/47_favor_government_mandated_political_balance_on_radio_tv 
[https://perma.cc/JQ5H-9AYY]. Among the other respondents, thirty-nine percent said “no” and 
fourteen percent answered “not sure.” Id. In contrast, fifty-seven percent of those surveyed 
answered “no” to the question, “Should the government require web sites and bloggers that offer 
political commentary to present opposing viewpoints?” Id. Of the other respondents, thirty-one 
percent said “yes,” and twelve percent said “not sure.” Id. 
 156. See Alan Greenblatt, How Republicans and Democrats Ended up Living Apart, NPR (Nov. 
27, 2013, 11:09 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2013/11/26/247362143/how-
republicans-and-democrats-ended-up-living-apart [https://perma.cc/X9RB-YF3R]; see also 
TALISSE, supra note 2, at 73 (describing the trend of “social spaces . . . growing increasingly 
politically homogeneous” as “robust” and “applying to social spaces across the board”).  
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be counterproductive if commandeered by narrow interests, as occurred 
with Hollywood’s blacklisting practice during the period of fears about 
communism in the 1950s. Similarly, anticompetitive interests could 
dominate, leading to a system that promotes certain commercial 
interests at the expense of broader public concerns. Antitrust law may 
address this problem to some extent.157 At the same time, if antitrust 
law is vigorously enforced to reduce anticompetitiveness concerns 
without accounting for the benefits of a private standard, it could do 
more harm than good.158  
Social or political manipulation is another concern. If captured 
by liberals or conservatives, or Democrats or Republicans, a private 
system could be used to promote a particular viewpoint rather than to 
promote the distribution of accurate and complete information. 
Similarly, if private initiatives often better reflect weakly held but 
widespread preferences in the population, there is a risk that they could 
lead to discrimination against minority interests. The existence of 
organized hate groups certainly suggests that this is a risk if these 
groups form new media pressure groups or commandeer existing ones. 
In the long run, the most feasible and effective insurance against 
market, social, or political manipulation may arise from the 
composition of the stakeholder group that oversees the initiative and 
the need of that stakeholder group to maintain the legitimacy of the 
standard and its implementation. These are limited constraints, but 
they have enabled other private systems to succeed over the long 
term.159   
Spillover Effects. What effect will a private initiative have on the 
likelihood of government responses to information problems? Private 
actions could have negative spillover effects on government’s ability to 
act. This could arise through the expressive effects of private action if 
 
 157. For instance, a private association organized to regulate media operations or content 
must not run afoul of the antitrust standard set forth in Fashion Originators’ Guild (known as 
FOGA). Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). The 
marketplace of ideas can be seen as a form of check and balance. There is an important normative 
dimension to antitrust in cases including companies like Comcast and AT&T, where concentration 
of market power influences the flow of information in an intellectual marketplace. 
 158. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Ben Raker, Private Governance and the New Private 
Advocacy, 32 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 45, 49 (2017) (noting that in the context of private 
environmental advocacy, “[f]or some [private] initiatives, the risks of anticompetitive behavior 
could outweigh the benefits of increased environmental protection”).  
 159. For a review of the effects of sustainability certification and standards systems, see 
TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 17, at 9 (citing “data on the current market status of key 
voluntary standards and certification systems relating to forestry, fisheries, and food”); and Errol 
E. Meidinger, Environmental Certification Programs and U.S. Environmental Law: Closer than 
You Think, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10162, 10163 (2001) (arguing that “environmental certification 
programs are likely to become important engines of change in American environmental law”).  
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the existence of private action undermines the idea that government 
has an important role and can perform it effectively. Negative spillover 
effects also could occur if individuals believe that the problem has been 
solved and thus do not push for a better government solution, or if they 
engage in moral licensing, concluding that because they took one 
positive step (e.g., watching a fairness-certified television program) 
they are licensed to take a negative step (e.g., retweeting inaccurate 
information).160 Private initiatives could also divert funds, management 
attention, or enthusiasm from public to private actions. At the same 
time, private initiatives can have positive spillover effects by 
demonstrating proof of concept, reducing the costs of compliance with 
government mandates, demonstrating efficacy, and bypassing 
worldview-based opposition to public governance. Overall, spillover 
issues are important, but a growing body of research suggests that 
many types of negative spillover effects can be reduced if not 
prevented.161  
Extensions. The private fairness doctrine initiative is only one of 
many possible private options that could buttress democratic processes. 
The important move at this point is to overcome the failure of 
imagination that can occur if we focus only on government checks and 
balances and overlook social checks and balances. An example of a new 
option is the concept of the private campaign finance contract discussed 
by Ganesh Sitaraman and deployed by Scott Brown and Elizabeth 
Warren.162 As Sitaraman noted, the contract between Brown and 
Warren could serve as a model for campaign finance agreements in 
other campaigns. For a range of reasons, however, the concept has not 
gone viral. Although it may be the case that few races involve incentives 
for both candidates to enter into a voluntary campaign finance 
agreement, the assumption that campaign finance is a matter of public 
law may have induced candidates to miss the rhetorical advantage of 
 
 160. For a discussion of positive and negative spillover effects, see Heather Barnes Truelove 
et al., Positive and Negative Spillover of Pro-environmental Behavior: An Integrative Review and 
Theoretical Framework, 29 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 127 (2014).  
 161. Id. at 135–36. 
 162. See Sitaraman, supra note 27, at 757 (describing generally the private-ordering “self-
enforcing contract” as one “between . . . opposing campaigns, in which each campaign agrees to be 
penalized from its own campaign treasury for any spending from an outside group that supports 
the candidate”). The Brown-Warren contract limited the contributions that each candidate would 
accept in the 2012 Massachusetts Senate race. See id. at 757–58 (describing “The Peoples’ Pledge” 
signed by Senators Scott Brown and Elizabeth Warren in January 2012, which “required each 
campaign to pay to charity the equivalent of 50% of any third party’s advertising costs for 
advertisements that benefitted their candidacy”). Although a promising innovation, the Brown-
Warren private campaign finance initiative has yet to be replicated widely in other U.S. 
campaigns. See id. at 758. This concept of social checks and balances can generate a wide range of 
promising options, and many other initiatives are possible in the campaign finance area.  
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offering to enter into an agreement. In other words, even if the opposing 
candidate declines to agree to enter into such an agreement, the refusal 
to do so can become fodder for debates and campaign advertisements. 
Over the longer term, private organizations can develop public 
databases that track and disclose which candidates declined to enter 
into these agreements and use public information campaigns to put the 
private campaign finance contract option on the national agenda. In 
addition, many other private governance possibilities exist in the 
campaign finance area.163 
Similarly, new initiatives could target the ease of voting and the 
integrity of vote counting. Several efforts are already underway 
regarding voting. For instance, a recent get-out-the-vote effort included 
roughly 150 companies ranging from Levi Strauss to Lyft to Walmart.164 
The initiative includes media campaigns, rides to the polls, and policies 
to allow employees to leave work to vote.165  
One of the ways in which a party can thwart the democratic 
system is to not only discourage voting, but also to change vote totals or 
to undermine the legitimacy of the system by creating doubt about vote 
totals. The extent to which actual interference with vote counting may 
have occurred in recent elections is beyond the scope of this Essay, but 
sufficient information exists about motives and opportunities to raise 
concerns. Several private options are available to address this problem. 
One is to fund and deploy a private exit-polling operation that is 
sufficiently robust to reveal discrepancies between actual vote totals 
and reported totals. Media outlets engage in exit polling now, but a 
more comprehensive, systematic effort that focuses on the most 
vulnerable elections may be able to ferret out even small interventions 
 
 163. An example is the recent effort to crowdsource support for a hypothetical senate opponent 
based on the incumbent’s vote on a hotly contested issue. See Eli Rosenberg, Activists Raised $1 
Million to Defeat Susan Collins if She Votes for Kavanaugh. She Says It’s Bribery, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 12, 2018, 9:06 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/09/12/activists-raised-
million-defeat-susan-collins-if-she-votes-kavanaugh-she-says-its-bribery/ [https://perma.cc/8PB7-
YFGF]. Another example of a private campaign finance initiative is an organization that would 
organize donor matching to create disincentives for major donors to unduly influence elections. 
The organization could identify donors (individuals or PACs) who would publicly announce that 
they plan to match the donations of a specific, comparable donor in the other party or on the other 
side of an issue. In that way, both donors would have a reduced incentive to give to the campaign 
since any gift would provoke an equal response. This would not be a silver bullet (e.g., contributions 
could be hidden or donors could believe that their campaign contribution would be more effectively 
used than contributions to the opposing campaign), but it might discourage some of the largest 
single-donor or single-PAC interventions in elections. 
 164. Kaitlyn Tiffany, Why Do Brands Care if You Vote?: It’s About Democracy, but It’s Also 
About the Bottom Line, VOX (Sept. 24, 2018, 3:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/the-
goods/2018/9/24/17897194/walmart-lyft-get-out-the-vote-midterm-elections-2018-patagonia 
[https://perma.cc/9FPS-6925] (discussing the “Time to Vote” campaign). 
 165. See id.  
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in the process. This effort may assist litigants who challenge a vote 
tally, and knowledge that the exit-polling data will be extensive and 
publicly available could discourage vote manipulation efforts.  
Another possibility is a naming-and-shaming campaign directed 
at the makers of voting machines. The procurement of voting machines 
is not a visible process to most voters or private actors who could 
influence procurement, but it could be. Private initiatives could subject 
state and local government officials to greater public accountability 
regarding their voting machine choices. But even if these officials are 
insulated, the companies that make the machines could be subject to 
boycotts led by advocacy groups (to the extent they sell products that 
are subject to market pressure) and campaigns directed at employee 
morale. These companies could also be subject to pressure from 
investors, lenders, and suppliers. These are just a few of the many 
possible private initiatives that could buttress basic democratic 
processes.  
CONCLUSION 
This Essay focuses on the flow of information necessary to 
sustain democratic discourse, and it focuses on two developments that 
have contributed to the polarized, dysfunctional discourse that is 
common today. The first is the transformation of the media sector over 
the last several decades. The radio and television sectors have shifted 
from being dominated by a few large traditional media firms with some 
incentive to retain the credibility of people across the political spectrum 
to the current combination of traditional and new media, both of which 
have incentives to create narrow information channels that enable 
individuals to insulate themselves from facts and opinions inconsistent 
with their worldview.166 The second is the withdrawal of the federal 
government from the role of policing the fairness and accuracy of 
information conveyed by the media. Beginning in 1949, the FCC’s 
Fairness Doctrine imposed equal time, editorial reply, and other 
requirements on radio and television stations. Although the Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine in Red Lion 
Broadcasting v. FCC,167 the FCC eliminated the Fairness Doctrine in 
1987, and the next decade saw an explosion in the number of talk radio 
 
 166. See Bump, supra note 77 (describing “two overlapping trends”—increased polarization 
between Democrats and Republicans, and the fragmentation of media sources caused by the 
internet and social media). 
 167. 395 U.S. 367, 400–01 (1969). 
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stations as well as the founding in the mid-1990s of Fox News and 
MSNBC.168  
In response, this Essay suggests a new private fairness doctrine. 
Despite the obvious difficulties with any effort to regulate the content 
and flow of information, the issues today are whether the deep flaws in 
modern democratic discourse warrant some intervention and whether 
a private option is preferable to a government option. By contributing 
to a poorly informed, insular, and deeply divided electorate, the 
channelization of information flow can undermine democratic discourse 
and the social checks and balances that constrain misbehavior by 
politicians. The experience over the last two decades with other private 
governance initiatives suggests that a private option is viable. Although 
this Essay argues that private initiatives can improve the information 
available for democratic discourse, the more fundamental point is that 
scholars and democracy advocates should avoid the assumption that 
efforts to change government are the only way to improve government. 
Instead, in some cases parallel private initiatives are more viable and 
can buttress formal democratic processes.   
 
 168. See Cuomo, supra note 128 (“Scarcity has been replaced with 10,000 radio stations and 
more cable channels than there is programming to fill them.”); Lepore, supra note 13 (describing 
how the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine “made possible a new kind of partisan talk radio” and 
subsequently, “[p]artisan cable television”). 
